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ABSTRACT

The Conditional Reasoning Test for Aggression (CRT-A; James, 1998; James &
McIntyre, 2000) is an inductive reasoning test designed to assess the extent to which
individuals use implicit reasoning biases – known as justification mechanisms (JMs) – to
justify engaging in behavioral aggression. James and colleagues (James, 1998; James &
Mazerolle, 2002; James et al., 2005) have consistently described the CRT-A as an
indirect measure of these implicit cognitions, or JMs, but they recently reframed their
discussion of the test to emphasize its theoretical grounding in the concept of defense
mechanisms (A. Freud, 1936/1966). In particular, they indicated that the JMs for
aggression are influenced by the defense mechanism known as Rationalization (James et
al., 2005). However, a close examination of the JMs for aggression reveals that they may
also be influenced by a number of additional defense mechanisms. The main purposes of
this paper are: 1) To demonstrate the theoretical consistency between defense
mechanisms and the CRT-A, and 2) to empirically evaluate the extent to which the CRTA and its JMs for aggression are related to specific, theoretically relevant defense
mechanisms. The theory of ego defense is reviewed, the CRT-A is integrated into the
framework of that theory, the JMs for aggression are aligned with specific defense
mechanisms that appear similar in function and form, and hypotheses are developed to
guide empirical tests of the proposed relations between the JMs for aggression (as
assessed with the CRT-A) and those specific defense mechanisms (as assessed with both
the Defense-Q [Davidson & MacGregor, 1996] and the MacORDS [MacGregor, Olson,
Langford, Meterson, & Lahti, 2003]). Results were largely non-supportive of the
v

hypotheses. In particular, none of the defense mechanisms under investigation
(Rationalization, Projection, Grandiosity, Turning Against Others, Identification with the
Aggressor, Devaluation, and Neurotic Denial) showed any relation to the CRT-A at the
item level. Furthermore, only Grandiosity showed a somewhat consistent relationship
with CRT-A scale scores, and even this was exceptionally small. Implications include the
possibility that JMs for aggression are not as implicit/unconscious as once believed, and
that the CRT-A’s predictive ability may be cogently explained in terms of the theory of
threatened egotism (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996).
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In 1998, James introduced the Conditional Reasoning measurement technique as a
new and innovative approach to personality assessment. Since that time, Conditional
Reasoning has been the subject of a growing body of empirical research. To date, only
two complete Conditional Reasoning Tests (CRTs) exist: The original test for
achievement motivation and fear of failure, and a second test geared toward the
assessment of aggression. Of late, research attention has focused mainly on the
Conditional Reasoning Test for Aggression (CRT-A).
Since the introduction of the CRT-A (James, 1998; James & McIntyre, 2000),
substantial amounts of data have been accumulated to support the reliability and validity
of inferences drawn from the test. For example, a recent publication (James et al., 2005)
presented evidence suggesting that the CRT-A shows reasonable internal consistency
(e.g., the average item-total correlation was .76) and stability across alternative forms
(e.g., there was an average of 81.4% agreement in responses across two versions of the
test). Furthermore, results from eleven studies utilizing various kinds of samples (e.g.,
patrol officers, undergraduates, package handlers) and criterion measures (e.g.,
supervisory performance ratings, student conduct violations, theft) indicated an average
uncorrected validity of .44 for predicting behavioral indicators of aggression (validity
coefficients ranged from .32 to .64; James et al., 2005). In comparison to other single
measures used to predict behavioral criteria, these numbers show great promise. For
1

example, personality measures have typically shown validities in the mid-.20s for
predicting behavioral outcomes, and these validities are rarely seen to exceed .30 (e.g.,
Barrick & Mount, 1991; Hough & Furnham, 2003; Hurtz & Donovan, 2000).
One explanation for these higher-than-average validity coefficients stems from
the theory and design of the CRT-A itself, which differs substantially from traditional
self-report measures of personality. That is, whereas standard self-report personality
inventories typically function as direct measures of explicit cognitions, the CRT-A is
designed to function as an indirect measure of implicit cognitions. According to
Greenwald and Banaji (1995), indirect measures are those, “…which neither inform the
subject of what is being assessed nor request self-report concerning it” (p. 5), and they
define implicit cognition as an “…introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified)
trace of past experience that mediates [a response]” (p. 5). Because the CRT-A is
presented as an inductive reasoning test (e.g., the test instructions ask respondents to read
each item and choose the most logical response; the response set for each item includes
both logical and illogical response options) as opposed to a traditional personality test
(e.g., at no point in time is the CRT-A described to the respondent as a measure of
personality; respondents answer questions by identifying what they believe to be the most
logical response rather than by introspection into their own characteristics and/or
behavior), it meets Greenwald and Banaji’s (1995) definitional criteria for an indirect
measure. Furthermore, because the targets of measurement with the CRT-A –
justification mechanisms for aggression – are presumed to operate outside of an
individual’s awareness and therefore be unavailable to conscious introspection, it also
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meets their criteria for a measure of implicit cognitions (for a full description of the
development and structure of the CRT-A, see James, 1998; James et al., 2005).
In sum, the CRT-A differs from traditional self-report personality instruments in
terms of both what is measured and how the measurement is accomplished, either of
which could potentially lead to the surprisingly high validity coefficients observed with
the CRT-A. For example, indirect measures may be less prone to intentional response
distortion, or faking, than direct measures (LeBreton et al., 2007; Viswesvaran & Ones,
1999), which could plausibly affect observed validities. Furthermore, McClelland and
colleagues (McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989) summarized evidence indicating
that implicit and explicit motives may relate differently to different types of behavioral
criteria. Thus, it may be that the relatively high validity coefficients observed in relation
to the CRT-A are due to a higher level of correspondence between the predictor and the
criterion measures of interest.
James has consistently described the CRT-A as an indirect measurement system
for the assessment of implicit cognitions that individuals use to justify or rationalize
behavioral aggression (James, 1998; James & Mazerolle, 2002; James et al., 2005). The
implicit cognitions, or justification mechanisms, to which he refers are the targets of
measurement with the CRT-A. However, there has been a subtle and progressive change
in the terminology James has employed in defining justification mechanisms (JMs) and in
describing their purpose and function.
In his initial discussion of the CRT-A, James (1998) defines JMs as, “…reasoning
processes whose purpose is to enhance the logical appeal of [an individual’s] behavioral
choices” (p. 131), and he notes that, “These assumptions, inferences, and implicit
3

theories are thought of as JMs because they involve tacit attempts to enhance the logical
appeal of [motive-driven] behaviors” (p. 133, italics added). Inherent in these statements
is the possibility that JMs may operate outside of an individual’s conscious awareness.
However, it is only in his next major treatment of the CRT-A (James & Mazerolle, 2002)
that the notion of unconscious processing is made explicit in defining JMs for aggression:
“Justification mechanisms are defined as nonconscious biases whose purpose is to define,
shape, and otherwise influence reasoning (i.e., framing and analysis) so as to enhance the
rational appeal of behaving aggressively” (p. 11, italics added). In that same publication
(James & Mazerolle, 2002), James underscores the unconscious nature of JMs by stating
that individuals, “…unknowingly rely on different implicit assumptions to build rational
cases for [their behavior]” (p. 16, italics added), and that JMs are, “…unknowingly
engendered by differences in underlying personalities” (p. 17, italics added).
In their most recent work on the CRT-A, James and colleagues (James et al.,
2005) take yet another step in explaining the unconscious functioning of JMs for
aggression. Specifically, they draw an explicit link between JMs and the classical
psychological concept of defense mechanisms, noting that, “Recent thinking and research
on defense mechanisms, the unconscious, and implicit biases in social cognition …” had
been a driving force behind the development of the CRT-A (p. 70). Moreover, they
reframe their discussion of the purpose and functioning of JMs for aggression to reflect
their roots in defense mechanisms:
“The conditional reasoning system focuses on the degree to which conscious
thinking is influenced by the defense mechanism of ‘rationalization’…What
makes rationalization unique is that the true but unconscious intent of reasoning is
4

to enhance the rational appeal of behaviors that express aggressive individuals’
desire to inflict harm. This intent is accomplished via the use of ‘justification
mechanisms,’ which are self-protective biases that implicitly shape reasoning so
as to enhance the rational appeal of behaving aggressively…” (p. 72-73).
It is the purpose of this dissertation to clarify and explore the relation between the
CRT-A’s JMs for aggression and defense mechanisms. In the following sections, the
author will: 1) introduce the basic tenets of the theory of defense mechanisms, 2) review
the theory and design of the CRT-A, 3) clarify the theoretical overlap between the CRTA and the concept of ego defense, 4) illustrate the convergence of the JMs for aggression
with specific defense mechanisms including, but not limited to, Rationalization, and 5)
introduce research questions to guide an empirical investigation of the theoretical
similarities that are put forth.
Defense Mechanisms
Freud’s concept of defense mechanisms has made a deep and lasting impression
in the field of psychology. Several recent authors have reviewed the resurgence or
“(re)discovery” of defenses in a variety of research areas in psychology, including the
fields of personality, social, cognitive, and developmental psychology (e.g., Cramer,
1998b, 2000). Furthermore, although defense mechanisms have been the subject of
debate throughout the years since they were first described (for a review, see Cramer,
2000; Norem, 1998), the inclusion of a Defensive Functioning Scale as a proposed future
diagnostic axis in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) aptly illustrates the
importance of defenses in describing and explaining human behavior.
5

Conceptual Origins and Theory of Defense Mechanisms
In the late nineteenth century, Sigmund Freud originally described defense
mechanisms as unconscious mental operations that protect an individual from aversive
emotions or ideas. He postulated that defenses function by blocking, distorting, or
screening mental content from conscious awareness in order to protect an individual from
unpleasant affective states such as anxiety (e.g., S. Freud, 1894/1962, 1926/1959, as cited
in A. Freud, 1936/1966; Vaillant, 1992). Freud’s conceptualization of defense
mechanisms varied throughout his career as he gradually identified a growing list of
distinct defense mechanisms (Vaillant, 1992). However, it was only when his daughter,
Anna Freud, published The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense (1936/1966) that the
theory of defense mechanisms was described in one cohesive work (MacGregor & Olson,
2005).
A. Freud (1936/1966) explained the theory of defense mechanisms by detailing
the interplay between three hypothetical structures within the mind: The id, the superego,
and the ego. According to A. Freud, the id is the seat of innate impulses and drives. She
described the id as an entity whose contents are unavailable to conscious introspection,
such that, “…we can only learn of its contents when impulses are aroused and invade the
ego in search of gratification and there…produce feelings of tension and unpleasure…”
(p. 5). Additionally, she indicated that the id operates under the “pleasure principle”; that
is, when id impulses are aroused, the id’s only concern is the gratification of those
impulses, without heed for external constraints or implications. However, external
constraints often do exist, and it is with those that the superego is concerned.
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The superego is often described as the conscience, and it seeks to constrain
behavior within learned ethical and moral boundaries. When id impulses arise that
threaten to cross these boundaries, the superego, “…confronts the ego with hostility…or
criticism…[resulting in a perceptible state of guilt within the ego]” (A. Freud, 1936/1966,
p. 6). However, if an id impulse is not in conflict with the superego’s dictates, the
superego and the ego essentially coincide.
The ego, then, is the seat of action which must mediate between demands of the id
and the superego. Operating under the “reality principle,” it is the ego’s responsibility to
ensure that the id’s impulses are satisfied while simultaneously respecting the constraints
set forth by the superego. Failure to uphold either of these responsibilities would result in
unpleasant affective reactions such as guilt or anxiety.
As A. Freud explained (1936/1966), when an id impulse is aroused, it enters the
ego in search of gratification. If the impulse does not conflict with the superego’s
demands, the ego, “…puts its own energies at the [id’s] disposal…” (p. 6) for the direct
gratification of that impulse. However, if the impulse does conflict with the superego, the
ego automatically (i.e., without an individual’s conscious control or awareness) takes
action to facilitate the indirect satisfaction of the impulse. For example, the ego may
modify, redirect, distort, or completely block out the id impulse in such a way that the
impulse is discharged without arousing the disapproval of the superego. In summary,
when id impulses conflict with superego demands, the ego may enact mechanisms to
defend against the unpleasant affective reactions of an unsatisfied id or a dissatisfied
superego, hence the term ego mechanisms of defense.

7

Modern Conceptualizations of Defense Mechanisms
S. Freud’s original thoughts on the topic of ego defense grew out of his work with
patients experiencing various psychological disturbances. As a result, his descriptions of
defense mechanisms were focused on their role in psychopathology. Although the gist of
S. Freud’s original conceptualization of defense mechanisms remains intact, the focus has
been expanded in modern times to include a concern with normative psychological
functioning. Defenses are no longer strictly bound to the tenets of psychoanalytic theory,
and beliefs about their function have extended beyond the reactive warding off of
unpleasant affect to include more proactive functions such as protection of the selfconcept and the pursuit of well-being (Cooper, 1998; Cramer, 1998b). In a special issue
of The Journal of Personality that was devoted entirely to the topic of defense
mechanisms, Cramer (1998b) put forth a definition that reflected this change:
The term “defense mechanism” refers to a mental operation that occurs outside of
awareness. The function of the defense mechanism is to protect the individual
from experiencing excessive anxiety. According to the older, classical
psychoanalytic theory, such anxiety would occur if the individual became aware
of unacceptable thoughts, impulses, or wishes. In contemporary thinking about
defenses, an additional function is seen to be the protection of the self – of selfesteem and, in more extreme cases, protection of the integration of the self. (p.
885)
In recognition of the difficulty researchers have encountered in their attempts to
operationalize defense mechanisms, Davidson and MacGregor (1998) delineated six
specific criteria implicit in Cramer’s (1998b) definition. First, defense mechanisms are
8

unconscious; that is, defenses function outside of an individual’s conscious control or
awareness. As such, defense mechanisms are latent constructs which cannot be directly
observed, but may only be inferred from their manifestation in defensive behavior
(Cramer, 1991; Wallerstein, 1985). However, whereas ego defenses operate
unconsciously, this aspect of the definition does not imply that defensive behavior is
necessarily unconscious. On the contrary, an individual may be perfectly aware of a
behavior that he or she is engaging in, but if defense mechanisms have been in operation,
the individual will be unaware of the true motive or impulse behind that behavior.
The second definitional criterion for defense mechanisms (Davidson &
MacGregor, 1998) is that they operate in response to psychic threat, which may take the
form of unacceptable thoughts and impulses as in classical psychoanalytic theory, or of
threats to the self-concept as in the more modern conceptualization. Third, defense
mechanisms function to prevent and/or manage aversive affect which would result from
the aforementioned psychic threat if not for the operation of the defense. Fourth, defense
mechanisms function as part of the normal personality. As a result, although they may
show patterns of change across the lifespan, defenses are seen as relatively stable and
predictable aspects of psychological functioning. Fifth, defense mechanisms are adaptive,
as they help individuals adjust to and function in the ever-changing social world. It
should be noted, however, that while defense mechanisms may be adaptive for the
individual (i.e., by aiding in the management of competing demands in their internal and
external environments), this does not guarantee that the resultant defensive behavior will
be adaptive for the individual in the long run. Furthermore, as Davidson and MacGregor
(1998) note, excessive or rigid reliance on a limited repertoire of defenses may contribute
9

to the development of psychopathology, and therefore prove to be maladaptive for the
individual. The sixth and final definitional criterion for defense mechanisms is that it
should be possible to distinguish between the operation of different defenses.
In The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, A. Freud (1936/1966) not only put
forth the basic theory of defense mechanism, but she also provided a cumulative listing
and explanation of all of the different defense mechanisms that had been identified by
Sigmund Freud and herself at that time. In the years that have followed, theorists,
researchers, and clinicians have identified and described a number of additional defenses.
An examination of the literature reveals numerous lists that vary in their degree of
overlap and inclusiveness (for a review, see Vaillant, 1992). Some defense mechanisms
show up in virtually every list (e.g., repression, which “…forms the cornerstone upon
which all other defense mechanisms are based…” [Davidson & MacGregor, 1998, p.
969]), whereas others are somewhat idiosyncratic. Although Vaillant (1992) has indicated
a need for consensus in this matter, Schafer (1954) aptly noted that, “There cannot be any
‘correct’ or ‘complete’ list of defenses, but only lists of varying exhaustiveness, internal
theoretical consistency, and helpfulness in ordering clinical observation and research
findings” (p. 161) 1 .
Issues in the Measurement of Defense Mechanisms
Although defense mechanisms have stood the test of time and have seen a
resurgence of interest in many branches of psychology (e.g., Cramer, 1998b), there is still
a substantial amount of resistance to the concept, particularly in more traditionally
1

It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a listing and description of all the distinct defense
mechanisms that have been identified and defined in the literature. However, consistent with Schafer’s
(1954) comment, a select number of defenses that are theoretically relevant to the CRT-A and the JMs for
aggression will be provided in a later section of this paper.
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applied fields such as Industrial/Organizational psychology. There are several possible
reasons for this resistance. For example, applied psychologists may be uncomfortable
with aspects of the psychoanalytic theory from which defense mechanisms originated,
and they may be unaware that the modern conceptualization of defenses no longer
implies a strict focus on psychopathology (Cramer, 1998b). Furthermore, despite a
growing body of literature describing the overlap between defense mechanisms and welldocumented unconscious phenomena in other areas of psychology (e.g., the false
consensus effect in social psychology [Ross, Greene, & House, 1977]; for a review, see
Baumeister, Dale, & Sommer, 1998), there may be continued skepticism about the
existence, usefulness, and/or practicality of research on a construct that is, by definition,
unobservable. Although the first of these objections may be easily overcome by directing
skeptics to the recent literature on defense mechanisms, the black-box problem of
measuring the unobservable will likely be more difficult to overcome. However,
developments in the methods used to assess defense mechanisms may help to alleviate
this objection as well.
MacGregor and Olson (2005) provide a critical review of the most prominent
methods that have been used to assess defense mechanisms. In this review, the authors
note that while laboratory approaches (i.e., methods that require participants to make
judgments based on the experimentally manipulated presentation of stimuli) have high
reliability and are easily replicated, they may suffer from a lack of internal validity (i.e.,
differences in results may be due to factors other than differences in defense mechanisms
[Cook & Campbell, 1979]; also see Perry & Ianni, 1998). Secondly, they state that while
projective tests (e.g., the Thematic Apperception Test [Morgan & Murray, 1935]) offer a
11

theoretically consistent means of defense assessment and often show high inter-rater
reliability (also see Perry & Ianni, 1998), they are not practical for large-scale testing due
to time-consuming and labor-intensive testing and scoring procedures. Third, MacGregor
and Olson discuss self-report methods for assessing defenses (e.g., the Defense
Mechanisms Inventory [Gleser & Ihilevich, 1969; Ihilevich & Gleser, 1995]). They note
that while such measures offer an efficient means of data collection, allow objective
testing and scoring conditions, and show high test-retest reliability, they are subject to
intentional response distortion (also see Cramer, 1991). Moreover, self-reports – which
typically rely on introspective responses about one’s own behavior – have been criticized
as theoretically inappropriate for the measurement of defense mechanisms which are, by
definition, unconscious.
MacGregor and Olson (2005) wrap up their discussion by describing the strengths
and weaknesses of observational methods for defense mechanism assessment (e.g., the
Defense-Q [Davidson & MacGregor, 1996]). Specifically, they state that data collection
with observational methods may be time-consuming, that inter-rater reliability tends to be
lower than is seen with projective measures, and that scoring is more labor-intensive than
that of self-reports. However, observational ratings are more theoretically appropriate for
the measurement of defenses because they are based on samples of real behavior (e.g.,
they may consist of interviews that demonstrate how individuals actually react to stressful
or challenging situations), they show reasonable convergence with clinician-ratings of
defenses, they are less subject to the possibility of socially desirable responding, and
unlike many projective measures, clinical training and experience may not be necessary
for scoring (Perry & Ianni, 1998).
12

In summary, multiple methods exist for the measurement of defense mechanisms,
and there are strengths and limitations associated with each method. To some extent,
these strengths and limitations seem to balance each other out, such that there is no clear
“best” method for the assessment of defenses. However, when considered from the
perspective that a measurement method should, at the very least, be theoretically
consistent with the construct it is designed to measure (e.g., Eid & Diener, 2005), ordinal
relations begin to emerge. Namely, despite their ease of administration and scoring, selfreport measures quickly fall to the bottom of the list. Whereas self-report instruments are
clearly useful for assessing some aspects of personality (e.g., conscious, self-attributed
and/or reputational characteristics; Hogan, Hogan, & Roberts, 1996), they are less
appropriate than other types of measures for the assessment of unconscious defense
mechanisms. Furthermore, although typical laboratory approaches and projective
methods are amenable to the assessment of unconscious defense processes, they may
suffer from threats to ecological validity because they are not based on samples of reallife behavior (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Perry & Ianni, 1998). In contrast, although
observer-based methods may show lower reliability than other types of measures, they
appear to side-step some of the theoretical problems which plague those other methods.
From this perspective, observer-based methods may represent one of the most appropriate
available means for the assessment of defense mechanisms.
The Conditional Reasoning Test for Aggression
Although the Conditional Reasoning Test for Aggression (CRT-A) is a paper-andpencil test that respondents complete by themselves, it is not a self-report instrument in
the traditional sense. As part of their reframing of the test and its JMs in terms of defense
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mechanisms, James and colleagues (James et al., 2005) referred to the CRT-A as a
projective measure. That is, when individuals complete the CRT-A, they are not asked to
introspect on their own level of aggressiveness or their own tendency to engage in
aggressive behavior. Rather, they respond to a series of inductive reasoning problems for
which they are instructed to choose the most logical outcome or explanation from a set of
response options that follows each item.
The projective aspect of the CRT-A lies in the set of response options from which
individuals are asked to choose. In particular, each item on the test is followed by a
multiple-choice set of four possible response options – two of which are blatantly
illogical (i.e., distractor responses, included in the response set to enhance the face
validity of the test as a measure of reasoning ability as opposed to a measure of
personality), and two of which are inductively valid. Of the two inductively valid
response options, one is imbued with justification mechanisms (JMs) for aggression
whereas the other is based on neutral or prosocial reasoning. It is believed that aggressive
individuals, or those who characteristically employ JMs for aggression, will confer
logical priority to the response option that embodies one or more of those JMs for
aggression. Thus, individuals reveal their implicit motive to aggress, without being aware
that they have done so, through the projection of that motive or tendency into their
reasoning about the truth or logic of the biased (yet inductively valid) response (James et
al., 2005).
Aggressive Behavior and the Motive to Aggress
James cites classic work by Murray (1938) in defining the motive to aggress,
noting that, “Aggressiveness evolves from a desire or motive to overcome opposition
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forcefully, to fight, to revenge an injury, to attack another with intent to injure or kill, and
to oppose forcefully or punish another” (James & Mazerolle, 2002, p. 8). Behavioral
manifestations of the motive to aggress may include direct and active forms such as
verbal or physical attack, or more indirect and passive forms such as withholding of
effort or information. However, any type of behavior that is motivated by the intent to
harm another entity – whether that entity is an individual or a group, such as an
organization – can be considered aggressive behavior (Folger & Baron, 1996).
Fortunately for society, James and McIntyre (2000) cite data indicating that only about
12% of the general population seems to possess a strong or moderately strong motive to
aggress.
In their classic work on achievement motivation, McClelland and others
(McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953/1976) indicated that motives energize and
direct behavior. However, research has shown that self-attributed motives or desires (i.e.,
those that are consciously espoused) rarely show significant correlations with implicit
motives (i.e., those that are held unconsciously), and that the two types of constructs
differ in terms of the kinds of behaviors they best predict (for a review, see McClelland et
al., 1989). In particular, self-attributed motives appear most suited to the prediction of
behaviors with external or social incentives, whereas implicit motives show better
prediction of intrinsically rewarding behaviors.
Given that motives may have both implicit and explicit components, it follows
that individuals may possess motives of which they are unaware. Aggressive individuals,
in particular, may be unaware of their underlying motive to aggress because such a
motive conflicts with predominant social norms and has the potential to threaten the
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individual’s sense of self-worth (Baumeister et al., 1998; Cramer, 1998b, 2000). It is this
notion which led James to state that, “People like to believe that their behavior is sensible
and rational, as opposed to foolish and irrational. A specific instance of this axiom is that
people with strong motives to aggress tend to frame and analyze the world in ways that
justify – that is, that enhance the rational appeal of – the expression of aggression”
(James & Mazerolle, 2002, p. 9). In essence, the CRT-A was designed to capture this
conflict between the motive to aggress and the motive to protect the sense of self-worth
through the assessment of unconscious biases in the framing and analysis of the world.
Justification Mechanisms for Aggression
In developing the CRT-A, James (1998) scoured the academic and lay literatures
to identify implicit reasoning biases that aggressive individuals employ to rationalize or
justify their behavior. Theoretically, such implicit reasoning biases, or justification
mechanisms (JMs), allow individuals to express an underlying motive to aggress while
simultaneously protecting a favorable view of the self. James’ search culminated in a list
of six distinct JMs for aggression (James & Mazarolle, 2002; James et al., 2005): 1)
Hostile attribution bias; 2) potency bias; 3) retribution bias; 4) victimization by powerful
others bias; 5) derogation of target bias; and 6) social discounting bias. An explanation of
these JMs for aggression will be provided in a later section of this paper; however, Figure
1 contains the definitions provided by James and colleagues (James et al., 2005).
Theoretical Overlap Between the CRT-A and Concept of Defense Mechanisms
The theoretical underpinnings of the CRT-A have a considerable degree of
overlap with the concept and theory of defense mechanisms. The six definitional criteria
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1. Hostile attribution bias’s core is an implicit assumption that (like oneself) people tend to
be motivated by a desire to harm others. This latent bias is instrumental in shaping
conscious attempts to explain why others behave as they do. Such explanations show a
strong predilection to attribute behavior to malevolent purpose and harmful intent. Even
benign or friendly acts may be credited to hidden, hostile agendas designed to inflict
harm. The attributions of hostile intent are central to the aggressive person’s attempts to
rationalize his or her own hostile behaviors as acts of self-defense intended to ward off
physical or verbal attack.
2. Potency bias is grounded in the implicit assumption that interactions with others are
contests to establish dominance versus submissiveness. This bias unconsciously shapes
framing; the actions of others pass through a perceptual prism primed to distinguish (a)
strength, assertiveness, dominance, daring, fearlessness, and bravery from (b) weakness,
impotence, submissiveness, timidity, compliance, and cowardice. Such framing promotes
reasoning that the use of aggression to dominate others demonstrates strength, bravery,
control, and fearlessness. Not acting aggressively is associated with weakness, fear,
cowardice, and impotence. An aggressive person may thus rationalize aggression by
reasoning (a) that aggression is an act of strength or bravery that gains respect from
others and (b) that to show weakness is to invite powerful others to take advantage of
you.
3. Retribution bias centers on an implicit assumption that exacting retribution is of greater
consequence than preserving or maintaining a relationship. This bias surfaces as a
proclivity to favor retaliation as a more rational behavior than reconciliation. For
example, aggression is seen as justifiable if it is intended to restore respect or to exact
restitution for a perceived wrong. Retaliation is thus assumed to be more reasonable than
forgiveness, vindication appears more reasonable than reconciliation, and obtaining
revenge appears more reasonable than maintaining a relationship. This bias often
underlies justifications for aggression engendered by wounded pride, challenged selfesteem, and perceived disrespect.
4. Victimization by powerful others bias has as a nucleus an implicit assumption that the
powerful will inflict harm on the less powerful. This assumption underlies a conscious
proclivity to see oneself as the victim of inequity, exploitation, injustice, and oppression
by those who are more powerful in one’s life (e.g., parents, teachers, supervisors,
employing organizations, or institutions such as the Internal Revenue Service). Framing
of events, hypotheses about cause and effect, and confirmatory searches for evidence
both engender and reinforce inferences that people are being victimized by powerful
others. This reasoning furnishes the foundation for justifying acts of aggression as
warranted corrections of inequities or legitimate strikes against oppression.

Figure 1. Justification Mechanisms for Aggression
NOTE: Definitions and explanations of the JMs for aggression detailed in this table were
taken almost verbatim from James et al. (2005), “A Conditional Reasoning
measure for aggression,” Organizational Research Methods, 8, 69-99.
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5. Derogation of target bias consists of an unconscious tendency to characterize
those one wishes to make (or has made) targets of aggression as evil, immoral, or
untrustworthy. To infer or associate such traits with a target makes the target more
deserving of aggression.
6. Social discounting bias has at heart an implicit assumption that social customs
restrict free will and the opportunity to satisfy needs. Reasoning shaped by this
latent bias reflects disdain for traditional ideals and conventional beliefs. For
example, attempts to identify the most logically plausible causes of social events
typically lean toward the cynical and critical. Reasoning will further evidence a
lack of sensitivity, empathy, and concern for social customs, often accompanied
by the absence of rational prohibitions against behaving in socially unorthodox
ways. Socially deviant behavior intended to harm others is rationalized by
inferring that it allows one to attain freedom of expression, release from the
shackles of social customs, and liberation from confining social relationships.
Figure 1. Continued.
Source: James et al. (2005).
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for defense mechanisms (Davidson & MacGregor, 1998) discussed in an earlier section
of this paper serves as a useful framework with which to illustrate this integration.
First, the CRT-A is based on the idea that possession of a strong implicit motive
to aggress poses a threat to the maintenance of a favorable self-concept. Thus, the theory
behind the CRT-A indicates that a strong motive to aggress sets the stage for internal
conflict between opposing motives, such that conscious recognition of the implicit motive
to aggress could potentially damage an individual’s view of the self. This situation meets
the criterion of psychic threat outlined by Davidson and MacGregor (1998).
The conflict between these opposing motives within an individual (i.e., the motive
to aggress and the motive to see the self as a “good” person) creates a situation that – if
not alleviated – would result in feelings of inadequacy, immorality, or lack of self-worth
(i.e., the situation results in aversive affect which must be managed; Davidson &
MacGregor, 1998). The theory underlying the CRT-A indicates that aggressive
individuals manage this inherent conflict (i.e., adapt to the situation; Davidson &
MacGregor, 1998) by employing implicit reasoning biases known as justification
mechanisms (i.e., the JMs are unconscious and operate outside of an individual’s
awareness; Davidson & MacGregor, 1998).
James and colleagues (James, 1998; James & Mazerolle, 2002; James et al., 2005)
have identified and differentiated between six JMs that aggressive individuals may
employ to justify engaging in aggressive behavior (i.e., JMs are distinct from one
another; Davidson & MacGregor, 1998). Furthermore, the use of JMs for aggression is
assumed to be an aspect of normal personality functioning. That is, the CRT-A is
predicated on the notion that aggressive individuals are equipped with an array of JMs,
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and that inter-individual variance in the use of those JMs is a consistent and predictable
individual difference variable (i.e., JMs show stability; Davidson & MacGregor, 1998).
In summary, when the theoretical underpinnings of the CRT-A are compared
against modern criteria for recognizing and defining defense mechanisms, the degree of
fit between the concepts becomes evident. This theoretical overlap clarifies and bolsters
James and colleagues’ (James et al., 2005) reframing of the CRT-A as a measure rooted
in the theory of defense mechanisms. However, demonstrating consistency at the
theoretical level is only the first step in evaluating the extent to which the CRT-A and its
JMs for aggression are truly influenced by the operation of defense mechanisms. The
second step involves demonstrating consistency at the operational level of the JMs
themselves, and it entails a detailed content analysis of each JM for aggression, followed
by a close comparison of each JM against specific defense mechanisms that have been
described in the literature. Since James and colleagues (James et al., 2005) specifically
note the importance of Rationalization in the conditional reasoning system, the following
section will begin with a discussion of the operational similarity between Rationalization
and the JMs for aggression in general. Next, a proposition about the nature of the
relationship between the concepts of Rationalization and JMs for aggression will be
offered. Finally, each individual JM for aggression will be discussed in greater detail and
evaluated in terms of its operational similarity to other specific defense mechanisms.
The Relation of JMs for Aggression to Specific Defense Mechanisms
As noted previously, James and colleagues (James et al., 2005) state that, “The
conditional reasoning system focuses on the degree to which conscious thinking is
influenced by the defense mechanism of ‘rationalization’” (p. 72). Given that JMs for
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aggression are the targets of measurement with the CRT-A, it follows from this statement
that Rationalization influences conscious thinking through its influence on those JMs for
aggression. However, James and colleagues do not hypothesize about the strength or the
exact nature of this influence.
Rationalization and its Relation to the JMs for Aggression
Rationalization – which MacGregor and Davidson (1998) define as the
transformation of a threatening or anxiety-provoking impulse into a rational-sounding
and reassuring, yet distorted, explanation – shows strong parallels with the definition of
JMs in general. Indeed, though James has only recently made explicit mention of this
similarity, he has consistently defined JMs as tacit, implicit, or unconscious attempts to
enhance the logical appeal of motive-driven behavior (i.e., aggressive behavior in this
case), and he has always indicated that JMs serve a self-protective function (James, 1998;
James & Mazerolle, 2002; James et al., 2005). Theoretically, then, JMs work in the same
manner and toward the same general end as Rationalization (i.e., by distorting reality to
make the expression of an anxiety-provoking motive or impulse seem justified and
rational). However, whereas Rationalization – like any other defense mechanism – is
defined only in terms of its function or process (i.e., what is done with a threatening
impulse/motive), JMs for aggression are defined by three criteria: (a) their general
function or process (i.e., what is done with a threatening impulse/motive – it is
Rationalized), (b) their specific target (i.e., which threatening impulse/motive is being
Rationalized – in this case, the motive to aggress), and (c) their specific operational
characteristics (i.e., how the motive to aggress is being Rationalized – this will differ
depending on the particular JM for aggression that is employed).
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To summarize, JMs for aggression do not appear to be equivalent to defense
mechanisms in general, nor do they appear to be equivalent to the specific defense
mechanism known as Rationalization. However, just as James and colleagues (James et
al., 2005) note, Rationalization does appear to be related – both theoretically and
operationally – to the JMs for aggression assessed by the CRT-A. Specifically, use of
defensive Rationalization may be one of several influential factors in the use of JMs for
aggression, with other influential factors being the presence of a strong implicit motive to
aggress, and the possession of some additional repertoire of defense mechanisms that
assists in or directs the psychologically “safe” expression of that motive. In the remainder
of this section, the various JMs for aggression will be examined in relation to additional
defense mechanisms in an effort to shed light on this hypothetical defensive repertoire.
The Relation of Other Defense Mechanisms to the JMs for Aggression
As a first step toward identifying other specific defense mechanisms that may be
related to the use of JMs for aggression (i.e., in addition to Rationalization), the author
reviewed lists of defenses that had been compiled by various researchers and practitioners
(for a review, see Vaillant, 1992). A choice was made to base the content analysis of the
JMs for aggression on the list of 25 defense mechanisms assessed by Davidson and
MacGregor’s (1996) observer-report measure, the Defense-Q (see Figure 2 for a list of
these 25 defenses and their definitions). The Defense-Q was chosen because it represents
a comprehensive list of the major defenses that have been described in the literature.
Furthermore, the test manual for the Defense-Q (MacGregor & Davidson, 1998) provides
complete, consistent definitions for each defense mechanism it is designed to assess, as
well as clear examples that illustrate key distinguishing features of each defense.
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1. Sublimation is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or stress by
channelling feelings or impulses into socially acceptable and productive behaviours.
2. Reaction Formation is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or
stress by substituting opposite thoughts, feelings, or behaviour. The thoughts, feelings, or
behaviours substituted may be either positive or negative.
3. Displacement is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or stress by
transferring anxiety-provoking feelings or responses from an object onto another object
that is perceived as less threatening.
4. Dissociation is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or stress by
temporarily breaking down the integration of the components of consciousness then
detaching from and losing conscious contact with the environment and persons in the
environment.
5. Isolation is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or stress by
separating ideas and cognitions from emotions. At the time of the conflict, the person is
able to experience the cognitions but unable to experience the emotions.
6. Splitting is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or stress by
compartmentalizing the related affect states, objects, feelings, cognitions, etc., into
contradictory components and then failing to integrate the components into a complete
and cohesive whole.
7. Regression is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or stress by
reverting to a previously developmentally appropriate way of responding.
8. Devaluation is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or stress by
attributing exaggerated negative qualities to the object causing the conflict in order to
mitigate the threat.
9. Humor is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or stress by making
light of, or emphasizing the amusing or ironic aspects of the situation.
10. Identification with the Aggressor is the process by which a person deals with emotional
conflict or stress by taking on the same characteristics of the person or object causing the
anxiety.

Figure 2. Definitions of Defense Mechanisms Assessed with the Defense-Q.
NOTES: Definitional prerequisites for each of these defense mechanisms are that (a)
there is a threatening or anxiety-provoking impulse that causes intrapsychic
conflict, and (b) this conflict is at least temporarily relieved or resolved through
the operation of the defense. These definitions were reprinted with permission
from the test manual for the Defense-Q (MacGregor & Davidson, 1998).
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11. Turning Against the Self is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict
or stress by attributing exaggerated negative qualities to and blaming the self for the
cause of the conflict or anxiety.
12. Projection is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or stress by
falsely attributing his or her own distressing thoughts feelings or impulses to others.
13. Pseudoaltruism is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or stress
by helping others address an apparently similar conflict or stress rather than by helping
oneself.
14. Acting Out is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or stress
through potentially destructive actions where the negative consequences are not
considered. The actions must be related to the conflict or stressor.
15. Rationalization is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or stress
through distorted elaborations and explanations, which may be exaggerated.
16. Intellectualization is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or stress
by using abstract thinking and language and by making abstract generalizations, thereby
controlling or minimizing the related affect.
17. Fantasy is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or stress by
fantasizing or daydreaming, often as a substitute for relationships with others.
18. Psychotic Denial is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or stress
by breaking contact with and distorting external reality.
19. Undoing is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or stress by
engaging in repetitive thoughts, works, or actions that are directly or symbolically related
to the conflict.
20. Passive Aggression is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or
stress by indirectly and unassertively expressing thoughts, words, or actions towards the
object causing the conflict or stress. There is an overt appearance of general compliance
or indifference masking a more covert resistance or disapproval.
21. Repression is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or stress by
expelling wishes, thoughts, or experiences from conscious awareness, although traces of
the conflict may remain, such as related affect.

Figure 2. Continued.
Source: MacGregor & Davidson (1998).
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22. Neurotic Denial is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or stress
by not acknowledging consequences of the conflict or stressor that are apparent to most
others, such as related affect, action, or intentions. The conflict or stressor is recognized,
but the consequences are not.
23. Grandiosity is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or stress by
acting or thinking in a manner where exaggerated positive qualities or abilities are
attributed to him- or herself in an attempt to make him- or herself better than others.
24. Turning Against Others is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or
stress by blaming others for the conflict or for the outcome of one’s behaviour or actions.
25. Idealization is the process by which a person deals with emotional conflict or stress by
ascribing exaggerated positive qualities to an object related to the anxiety and then
through their association to these positively ascribed characteristics they have an increase
in self-esteem.

Figure 2. Continued.
Source: MacGregor & Davidson (1998).
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Hostile Attribution Bias. James and colleagues (James & Mazerolle, 2002; James
et al., 2005) list the hostile attribution bias among the JMs that aggressive individuals
may use to rationalize aggressive behavior. The authors define the hostile attribution bias
as an unconscious tendency for aggressive individuals to see malevolent intent in the
actions of others, even when those actions are neutral or benign (see Figure 1). This
illusion of provocation allows individuals to feel justified in behaving aggressively as a
means of self-defense. As a result, an individual can engage in behavioral expression of
his or her own implicit motive to aggress without experiencing a threat to the view of the
self as a “good” member of society. Thus, in a general sense, the hostile attribution bias
functions like a defensive Rationalization targeted at the expression of the motive to
aggress. However, Rationalization alone does not account for the particular operational
characteristics of the hostile attribution bias (i.e., how the motive to aggress is being
rationalized).
When compared against MacGregor and Davidson’s (1998) listing of defenses
assessed by the Defense-Q, it is evident that the hostile attribution bias bears an
operational similarity to the defense mechanism known as Projection (see Figure 2).
Projection is defined as the ejection of a threatening or anxiety-provoking impulse out of
the self, and the unrealistic relocation of that impulse into another non-self object
(MacGregor & Davidson, 1998). Projection, then, although not directly equivalent to the
hostile attribution bias, may be seen as a contributing influence in the use of that
particular bias as a JM for aggression. That is, the implicit motive to aggress is seen as a
psychic threat which conflicts with the motive to hold a favorable view of the self, and as
a means of managing that threat, the objectionable impulse (i.e., the motive to aggress) is
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unconsciously attributed to someone or something other than the self. With the stage thus
set by Projection, the hostile attribution bias can be effectively used like a Rationalization
for behaving aggressively.
Potency Bias. The potency bias appears next in James et al.’s (2005) list of JMs
for aggression. They define the potency bias as an unconscious tendency for aggressive
individuals to view social interactions as, “…contests to establish dominance versus
submissiveness” (p. 74; see Figure 1). This adversarial framing of social interactions
allows individuals to feel justified in behaving aggressively as a means of proving their
strength, and therefore their status as “better than” other individuals. Because of the
importance conferred to being better than others, an individual may safely express his or
her own implicit motive to aggress without experiencing a threat to the positive selfconcept. Thus, in a general sense, the potency bias functions like a defensive
Rationalization targeted at the expression of the motive to aggress. However, on its own,
Rationalization does not account for the specific operational features of the potency bias
(i.e., how the motive to aggress is being rationalized).
When considered alongside the list of defenses assessed with the Defense-Q, the
potency bias shows overlap with the defense mechanism known as Grandiosity (see
Figure 2). MacGregor and Davidson (1998) define Grandiosity as the transformation of a
threatening or anxiety-provoking impulse into a continued sense or assumption of one’s
specialness and superiority, such that one does not have to acknowledge the impulse as
threatening. Grandiosity, then, although not directly equivalent to the potency bias, may
be seen as a contributing factor in the use of that bias as a JM for aggression. That is, the
motive to aggress is seen as a psychic threat which conflicts with the motive to hold a
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favorable view of the self, and in order to manage the conflict, the threat of the impulse
(i.e., the motive to aggress) is attenuated by focusing on one’s own superiority and ability
to “best” any situation. With the stage thus set by Grandiosity, the potency bias can be
effectively used like a Rationalization for engaging in aggressive behavior.
Retribution Bias. The retribution bias is third in James et al.’s (2005) list of JMs
for aggression. Those authors define the retribution bias as an unconscious tendency for
aggressive individuals to prioritize retaliation or “getting even” over forgiveness or
reconciliation (see Figure 1). When faced with a perceived wrong, this implicit
preference for retaliation over forgiveness allows individuals to feel justified in behaving
aggressively as a means of punishing others to “teach them a lesson”. As a result, an
individual can engage in behavioral expression of his or her own implicit motive to
aggress without experiencing a threat to the view of oneself as a good and just person.
Thus, in a general sense, the retribution bias functions like a defensive Rationalization
targeted at the expression of the motive to aggress. However, Rationalization on its own
does not account for the particular operational characteristics of the retribution bias (i.e.,
how the motive to aggress is being rationalized).
Considered in tandem with the list of defenses in the Defense-Q, the retribution
bias is similar to the defense mechanism known as Turning Against Others. Turning
Against Others is defined as the transformation of a threatening or anxiety-provoking
impulse into an exaggerated level of blame, which is then turned out of the self and
attributed to an object other than the self (MacGregor & Davidson, 1998). Turning
Against Others, then, although not directly equivalent to the retribution bias, may be seen
as a contributing factor in the use of that bias as a JM for aggression. That is, the implicit
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motive to aggress is seen as a psychic threat which conflicts with the motive to hold a
favorable view of the self, and in order to manage that threat, the impulse (i.e., the motive
to aggress) is transformed into a desire to seek (vigilante) justice through the punishment
of wrong-doers. Thus, with the groundwork laid by Turning Against Others, the
retribution bias can be effectively used like a Rationalization for behaving aggressively.
Victimization by Powerful Others Bias. A fourth JM for aggression discussed by
James and colleagues (James et al., 2005) is the victimization by powerful others bias.
This bias is defined as an unconscious tendency for aggressive individuals to assume that
people in positions of power intend to purposefully harm less powerful individuals (see
Figure 1). This implicit belief allows individuals to feel justified in behaving aggressively
as a means of protecting the self or others from oppression by preemptively “turning the
tables” on would-be aggressors. As a result, an individual can engage in behavioral
expression of his or her own implicit motive to aggress without experiencing a threat to
the positive self-concept. In a general sense, then, the victimization by powerful others
bias functions like a defensive Rationalization targeted at the expression of the motive to
aggress. However, Rationalization alone does not account for the particular operational
features of the victimization by powerful others bias (i.e., how the motive to aggress is
being rationalized).
When the victimization by powerful others bias is considered in relation to the
defenses assessed with the Defense-Q, there is a degree of overlap with the defense
mechanism known as Identification with the Aggressor (see Figure 2). Identification with
the Aggressor is defined as a change in values, beliefs, or behavior to match those of the
object which caused a threatening impulse, and then an identification with that object
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(MacGregor & Davidson, 1998). Identification with the Aggressor, then, although not
directly equivalent to the victimization by powerful others bias, may be seen as a
contributing factor in the use of that bias as a JM for aggression. That is, the implicit
motive to aggress is seen as a psychic threat that conflicts with the motive to hold a
favorable view of the self. In order to adapt to and manage that threat, the individual
transforms his or her perception of the objectionable impulse (i.e., the motive to aggress)
and identifies with that impulse to preemptively victimize the would-be victimizer. With
the stage thus set by Identification with the Aggressor, the victimization by powerful
others bias can be effectively used like a Rationalization for behaving aggressively.
Derogation of Target Bias. The derogation of target bias appears fifth in James et
al.’s (2005) list of JMs for aggression. They define the derogation of target bias as an
unconscious tendency for aggressive individuals to characterize intended targets of
aggression as, “…evil, immoral, or untrustworthy…[and therefore] more deserving of
aggression” (p. 74; see Figure 1). This demonizing of an intended target allows
individuals to feel justified in behaving aggressively toward that target because “bad
people deserve bad things”. As a result, an individual can express his or her implicit
motive to aggress without realizing a threat to the favorable view of the self. Thus, in a
general sense, the derogation of target bias functions like a defensive Rationalization
targeted at the expression of the motive to aggress. However, Rationalization on its own
does not account for the particular operational characteristics of the derogation of target
bias (i.e., how the motive to aggress is being rationalized).
The derogation of target bias bears a strong resemblance to the defense
mechanism known as Devaluation, as defined in the Defense-Q (see Figure 2).
30

MacGregor and Davidson (1998) define Devaluation as the ascription of exaggerated
negative characteristics to the object of an anxiety-provoking impulse. Devaluation, then,
although not directly equivalent to the derogation of target bias, may be seen as a
contributing factor in the use of that bias as a JM for aggression. That is, the implicit
motive to aggress is seen as a psychic threat that conflicts with the motive to hold a
favorable view of the self. In order to manage that threat, the objectionable impulse (i.e.,
the motive to aggress) is unconsciously transformed into the characterization of others in
extremely negative terms. With the stage thus set by Devaluation, the derogation of target
bias can be used effectively like a Rationalization for aggressive behavior.
Social Discounting Bias. The final JM for aggression that James and colleagues
discuss is the social discounting bias. The social discounting bias is defined as an
unconscious tendency for aggressive individuals to discount or “write off” social norms
and customs that conflict with their own latent needs, motives, or desires (see Figure 1).
This disdain for and refusal to acknowledge social conventions allows the free and
justifiable expression of aggressive or antisocial behavior that would otherwise be
restricted by the accepted rules of social interaction. As a result, an individual can express
his or her implicit motive to aggress without experiencing a threat to the positive selfconcept. In general, then, the social discounting bias functions like a defensive
Rationalization targeted at the expression of the motive to aggress. However,
Rationalization in isolation does not account for the specific operational features of the
social discounting bias (i.e., how the motive to aggress is being rationalized).
In a final comparison against the list of defenses assessed with the Defense-Q, the
social discounting bias appears to incorporate the defense mechanism known as Neurotic
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Denial (see Figure 2). Neurotic Denial is defined as the division of a threatening or
anxiety-provoking impulse by banishing from awareness all thoughts and knowledge of
the consequences or implications of that impulse (MacGregor & Davidson, 1998).
Neurotic Denial, then, although not directly equivalent to the social discounting bias, may
be seen as a contributing factor in the use of that bias as a JM for aggression. That is, the
implicit motive to aggress is seen as a psychic threat that conflicts with the motive to hold
a favorable view of the self. In order to adapt to this threat, the impulse itself (i.e., the
motive to aggress) is split off from the anxiety-provoking consequences (i.e., what would
normally be seen as the logical outcomes of aggressive or antisocial behavior), and those
consequences are kept out of conscious awareness. With the stage thus set by Neurotic
Denial, the social discounting bias can be effectively used like a Rationalization for
behaving aggressively.
Summary
James and colleagues (James et al., 2005) state that the conditional reasoning
system, and therefore the JMs for aggression, are influenced by the defense mechanism
known as Rationalization. In an effort to clarify the nature of this relationship,
Rationalization and JMs for aggression were defined, and those definitions were reduced
to their most elemental levels and then compared. This comparison resulted in the
proposal that Rationalization is not equivalent to JMs for aggression, but that it appears to
be one of several factors related to their use – with other influential factors being the
presence of a strong motive to aggress and the existence of a repertoire of additional
defense mechanisms that help to determine the features and form of the various JMs for
aggression.
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To gain insight into the hypothetical defensive repertoire that may shape the JMs
for aggression, each JM was content-analyzed and compared against a representative list
of defense mechanisms that have been described in the literature. This comparison
resulted in a list of six specific defense mechanisms – one that matched up with each of
the six JMs for aggression – that may work in tandem with Rationalization when an
individual employs the various JMs for aggression: Projection (for the hostile attribution
bias); Grandiosity (for the potency bias); Turning Against Others (for the retribution
bias); Identification with the Aggressor (for the victimization by powerful others bias);
Devaluation (for the derogation of target bias); and Neurotic Denial (for the social
discounting bias). Although these defense mechanisms are not posited to be directly
equivalent to their corresponding JMs for aggression, they appear to be contributing
factors in the use of each particular bias as a means of rationalizing aggressive behavior.
General Summary
James and colleagues (James et al., 2005) recently reframed their presentation of
the CRT-A and the JMs that it was designed to assess by grounding their discussion in
the theory of defense mechanisms. Furthermore, they explicitly noted that JMs for
aggression are rooted in the defense mechanism known as Rationalization. In an effort
clarify and expand this notion, a review of the theory and definition of defense
mechanisms was provided. This background information was used to demonstrate the
theoretical consistency between defense mechanisms, the conditional reasoning system,
and the concept of JMs in general. Next, the nature of the relationship between
Rationalization and the CRT-A’s JMs for aggression was explored, resulting in the
proposition that Rationalization and JMs are not equivalent constructs, but that JMs for
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aggression are influenced by the combined operation of Rationalization and other defense
mechanisms directed toward expression of an implicit motive to aggress. Finally, to gain
insight into other defense mechanisms that might play a role in the use of JMs for
aggression, each of the six JMs for aggression was content-analyzed and matched with a
specific defense mechanism that appeared relevant to its functioning.
Current Investigation
Despite the theoretical links that have been established between defense
mechanisms, the CRT-A, and the JMs for aggression, to date these relations have not
been examined empirically. A growing body of research exists to demonstrate the
predictive value of the CRT-A, but few published studies have examined issues related to
the construct(s) assessed with the test. Furthermore, no existing studies have investigated
the extent to which use of the JMs for aggression, and therefore scores on the CRT-A, are
actually influenced by the use of defense mechanisms, as the test’s developers (e.g.,
James et al., 2005) and the current author have theorized. Thus, although the CRT-A is
gaining acceptance as a tool for predicting aggressive behavior, there is still no
documented empirical research to explain why. The CRT-A rests on a solid theoretical
foundation, but the lack of empirical testing of that foundation represents a critical gap in
the literature.
The current study was conceived as an initial step toward filling this gap in the
literature on Conditional Reasoning in general, and the CRT-A in particular. As
Cronbach and Meehl (1955) note, “Determining what psychological constructs account
for test performance is desirable for almost any test” (p. 282). This proposed
investigation was designed as a preliminary exploration of the extent to which
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theoretically relevant defense mechanisms account for use of the JMs for aggression and
for performance on the CRT-A. As a result, although no attempt will be made to propose
and validate a full model of the origin and function of the JMs for aggression, this
demonstration represents a useful and necessary foray into untested areas of the CRT-A’s
nomological network.
Development of Hypotheses
As noted previously, the defense mechanism known as Rationalization is
presumed to have an influence on the use of JMs for aggression in general. To the extent
that this presumption is valid, individuals who make greater use of Rationalization as a
defense mechanism should also show greater overall use of those JMs for aggression.
Individuals who Rationalize, then, should endorse a greater number of “aggressive” (i.e.,
JM-laden) responses on the CRT-A. That is:
Hypothesis 1a: Use of Rationalization as a defense mechanism will be
significantly positively related to overall scale scores on the CRT-A.
Moreover, since Rationalization is believed to influence the JMs for aggression in
general, it should also relate to the use of each specific JM. The keyed item responses to
CRT-A items are often based on more than one JM for aggression, so clear and
unequivocal JM-based subscales are not available for the CRT-A. However, because the
aggressive response option for each item is built on at least one of the JMs, individuals
who Rationalize should also show higher means on each item of the CRT-A as compared
to individuals who do not engage in defensive Rationalization. That is:
Hypothesis 1b: Use of Rationalization as a defense mechanism will be
significantly and positively related to scores on each keyed CRT-A item.
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Each of the additional defense mechanisms discussed in this paper (i.e.,
Projection, Grandiosity, Turning Against Others, Identification with the Aggressor,
Devaluation, and Neurotic Denial) is presumed to influence the use of a particular JM for
aggression (i.e., hostile attribution bias, potency bias, retribution bias, victimization by
powerful others bias, derogation of target bias, and social discounting bias, respectively).
However, as mentioned above, multidimensional response options to the CRT-A items
preclude the creation of clean JM-based subscales. Nevertheless, to the extent that each
defense mechanism is, indeed, related to its corresponding JM for aggression, use of that
defense mechanism should also be related to overall CRT-A scores. Stated formally:
Hypothesis 2a: Use of each of the following defense mechanisms will be
significantly positively related to overall scale scores on the CRT-A: Projection,
Grandiosity, Turning Against Others, Identification with the Aggressor,
Devaluation, and Neurotic Denial.
Furthermore, although exact JM-based subscales are not available in the CRT-A,
a recently published factor analysis (James et al., 2005) provides a useful framework for a
preliminary item-level assessment of these defense mechanism-JM pairs. Specifically,
James and colleagues’ analysis of CRT-A data from over 1,600 respondents yielded a
five-factor solution that was complex (e.g., several items had cross-loadings), yet
interpretable (i.e., one factor was derived for each of the JMs for aggression except the
derogation of target bias, which the authors noted would likely be eliminated in future
treatments of the CRT-A). To the extent that the aforementioned defense mechanism-JM
relationships hold, each defense mechanism should show a stronger relationship with the
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items that load on the corresponding JM-based factor (see Figure 3 for pattern of item
loadings for each factor). However, to reiterate, none of the CRT-A items appeared to tap
the derogation of target bias. As a result, no predictions are made about the use of
Devaluation (i.e., the defense mechanism that was shown to correspond to the derogation
of target bias). To summarize, it is expected that:
Hypothesis 2b: Use of each of the following defense mechanisms will be
significantly related to scores on the CRT-A items that tap the corresponding JM
for aggression: Projection (for the hostile attribution bias), Grandiosity (for the
potency bias), Turning Against Others (for the retribution bias), Identification
with the Aggressor (for the victimization by powerful others bias), and Neurotic
Denial (for the social discounting bias).
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Factor 1 – Social Discounting Bias
Item Loading
3
+
9
+
10
+
11
+
12
+
14
+
18
+
20
+
24
+
25
+

Factor 3 – Retribution Bias
Item Loading
4
+
5
+
7
+
13
+
17
+
24
+

Factor 2 – Victimization by Powerful Others
Item Loading
7
+
8
15
+
16
+
22
+
23
+
24
+
25
+

Factor 4 – Hostile Attribution Bias
Item Loading
3
13
16
+
17
+
19
+

Factor 5 – Potency Bias
Item Loading
8
+
11
+
21
+

Figure 3. Factor Loading Pattern for Items on the CRT-A.
NOTE: Information on the full factor analysis can be found in James et al. (2005), “A
Conditional Reasoning measure for aggression,” Organizational Research
Methods, 8, 69-99.
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CHAPTER 2

METHODS

Data for this study were drawn from an archival source at a major research
university in Western Canada. In addition to the CRT-A, the measures of defense
mechanisms chosen for inclusion in this study – the Defense-Q (Davidson & MacGregor,
1996) and the MacORDS (MacGregor et al., 2003) – are all contained in a single dataset
to which the author was granted access.
Participants
Data were collected from a total of 285 students from a large introductory
psychology class at a major Western Canadian university. Participants were
predominantly Caucasian (85%) and female (75%). As part of their course curriculum,
students were required to complete a number of measures and participate in various
research protocols. Measures were distributed and research participation was completed
at various times during the academic semester. Throughout the data collection period,
participants were treated in accordance with prevailing ethical guidelines (Canadian
Psychological Association, 2000). Furthermore, before the current author was granted
access to the data, all identifying information was removed from the dataset, and
participants were assigned research identification numbers. All data were treated in
accordance with APA Ethical Guidelines (American Psychological Association, 2002).
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Measures
The Conditional Reasoning Test for Aggression (CRT-A). The Conditional Reasoning
Test for Aggression (CRT-A) is a 22-item2 inductive reasoning test designed to assess the
implicit reasoning biases, or justification mechanisms, that individuals use to rationalize
engaging in aggressive or unreliable behaviors as opposed to socially adaptive or reliable
behaviors (James, 1998; James & Mazerolle, 2002; James et al., 2005). Response options for
the CRT-A are based, in part, on the JMs for aggression described in Chapter 1. Specifically,
each item on the CRT-A consists of a set of four multiple-choice response options. Of those
four options, two are inductively valid and two are inductively invalid. The invalid, or
illogical, response options are included in the response set to enhance the face validity of the
CRT-A as a test of reasoning ability. Furthermore, these “distractor” responses were designed
to be clearly illogical to individuals with at least a seventh grade reading level, and they are
very rarely chosen by respondents (James & McIntyre, 2000; James et al., 2005; LeBreton et
al., 2007). As a result, endorsement of five or more illogical responses by any respondent is
interpreted as an indicator of an invalid assessment (e.g., the respondent is either incapable of
reading at a seventh grade level, or s/he did not take the test seriously by paying careful
attention to each question), and that respondent’s data are excluded from future analyses. Of
the two inductively valid response options, one is based on reasoning biased by a JM for
aggression, whereas the other is based on neutral or prosocial reasoning (see Figure 4 for a
sample item from the CRT-A).

2

The CRT-A is actually composed of 25 items, but only 22 of those items are true conditional
reasoning problems (i.e., the response options consist of two illogical responses, one logical response based
on JMs for aggression, and one logical response based on neutral/prosocial reasoning). The remaining three
items (i.e., items 1, 2, and 6) are pure, or non-conditional, reasoning problems that are included in the CRTA to enhance the face validity of the test as a measure of reasoning ability.
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3. Joe is usually on time for work and for meetings with his boss and clients. He is also on time for
appointments with his doctor, dentist, and priest. However, Joe is always five or more minutes late for
meetings with Bill.
Which of the following is the most logical explanation for Joe being late for meetings with Bill?
a.
b.
c.
d.

Bill gets up later than Joe.
Joe is usually on time for people he respects, so he must not respect Bill.
Joe and Bill are both self-employed.
Joe and Bill are friends, so they don't care about being on time for each other.

Response options a and c are not inductively valid, as they do not follow logically from any information
presented in the stem of the item. Response option b is an inductively valid conclusion, and it is
considered the ‘aggressive’ response because it is based on an implicit assumption that tardiness is a way
to intentionally show disrespect to others. Response option d is also an inductively valid conclusion, but it
is considered the ‘non-aggressive’ response because it does not indicate an assumption of intent to do harm
to another individual.
Figure 4. Sample CRT-A Item and Explanation of Response Options.
SOURCE: James, L. R., & McIntyre, M. D. (2000). Conditional Reasoning Test of
Aggression test manual. Knoxville, TN: Innovative Assessment
Technology.
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The twenty-two conditional reasoning problems on the CRT-A are scored
dichotomously with “aggressive” responses coded as 1 and “non-aggressive” responses
coded as 0. The aggressive responses are summed to arrive at an overall aggression scale
score. As a result, the potential range of the scale is from 0 to 22, with higher scores
indicating a greater propensity to rely on the JMs for aggression, and therefore to endorse
as “logical” those response options associated with rationalizing aggressive behavior.
(Reliability and validity information for the CRT-A were discussed in Chapter 1.)
The Defense-Q. The Defense-Q (Davidson & MacGregor, 1996) is an observerrated idiographic Q-sort measure of defense mechanisms. Trained coders use the
Defense-Q to assess individuals’ relative use of 25 defense mechanisms (see Figure 2). In
the Defense-Q methodology, defenses are coded from a videotaped sample of behavior
from a 15-minute structured interview designed to pose interpersonally stressful and
challenging questions (Rosenman, 1978). Coders then use the Q-sort method
(Stephenson, 1953) to assess participants’ defense use, sorting each of the 25 defenses
into one of seven categories. Specifically, one of the 25 defense mechanisms is classified
as most uncharacteristic of an individual’s typical defense use (rank = 1), two are
classified as quite uncharacteristic (rank = 2), five as somewhat uncharacteristic (rank =
3), nine as neither characteristic nor uncharacteristic (rank = 4), five as somewhat
characteristic (rank = 5), two as quite characteristic (rank = 6), and one as most
characteristic (rank = 7). Assessment with the Defense-Q, then, yields a profile of
relative defense use for each participant assessed (see Appendix A for the coding sheet
used to generate Defense-Q profiles).
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Davidson and MacGregor (1996) have presented evidence that the Defense-Q can
be used to reliably assess the use of individual defense mechanisms. Using Cronbach’s
alpha and treating coders as items, they reported the average reliability for all 25 defense
mechanisms as .73. Although reliability coefficients for the individual defense
mechanisms showed a substantial range (i.e., from a low of .28 to a high of .92), the
majority of specific defenses to be examined in this study showed acceptable reliabilities
(Rationalization, .76; Projection, .75; Grandiosity, .83; Turning Against Others, .87;
Identification with the Aggressor, .49; Devaluation, .82; Neurotic Denial, .73).
Additionally, Davidson and MacGregor (1996) note that these numbers compare
favorably with other existing measures of defense mechanisms, such that even those
defenses with lower reliabilities (e.g., Identification with the Aggressor) are assessed with
the Defense-Q as well as, or better than, with other available measures.
The Defense-Q has been validated against other measures of defense mechanisms,
and it has been used to predict major health and psychosocial outcome variables.
Research that compares the Defense-Q to other observational measures of defense
mechanisms is not yet available (Davidson & MacGregor, 1996). However, studies
suggest that scores derived from measurement with the Defense-Q relate significantly,
and in the expected directions, with two commonly used self-report measures of defense
mechanisms (i.e., the Defense Style Questionnaire [DSQ; Bond, 1992, 1995] and the
Defense Mechanisms Inventory [DMI; Gleser & Ihilevich, 1969; Ihilevich & Gleser,
1995]; MacGregor & Olson, 2005). Furthermore, scores derived from the Defense-Q
have been shown to significantly predict aspects of mental health, physical health, and
psychosocial adjustment (e.g., Davidson, MacGregor, Johnson, Woody, & Chaplin, 2004;
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MacGregor, Davidson, Barksdale, Black, & MacLean, 2003; MacGregor, Davidson,
Rowan, Barksdale, & MacLean, 2003; MacGregor & Olson, 2005).
The MacGregor Observer Report Defense Scale (MacORDS). The MacGregor
Observer Report Defense Scale (MacORDS; MacGregor et al., 2003) is an observer-rated
normative measure of 26 defense mechanisms (i.e., it is used to assess the 25 defenses
defined in relation to the Defense-Q, plus a twenty-sixth defense known as
Somatization 3 ). As with the Defense-Q, the MacORDS is used to code defenses from a
videotaped sample of behavior from an interpersonally stressful 15-minute structured
interview (Rosenman, 1978). However, instead of using Q-sort methodology to classify
and rank the defenses, trained coders use a 5-point Likert-type scale to rate each
participant on their use of each defense mechanism included in the measure (see
Appendix B for the coding sheet used to generate MacORDS ratings).
Although the MacORDS is a new measure, MacGregor and colleagues
(MacGregor et al., 2003; Olson, MacGregor, et al., 2004) have conducted initial
investigations into the reliability and validity of the test. For example, treating coders as
items, they reported reliabilities for the assessment of individual defenses ranging from
.17 to .85 (average reliability across all defenses was .58). Although this overall
reliability is somewhat low, it is within acceptable range for measures in development
(MacGregor et al., 2003). Additionally, the MacORDS has shown significant and
theoretically expected relations with other measures of defenses (e.g., the DSQ) and with
3

Vaillant (1992) provided several appendices detailing other authors’ “assessment schemes” for
defense mechanisms, including definitions for the defenses assessed. He notes that the American
Psychiatric Association (1987) defines Somatization as, “A mechanism in which the person becomes
preoccupied with physical symptoms disproportionate to any actual physical disturbance”, whereas
Meissner (1980) defines Somatization as, “Defensive conversion of psychic derivatives into bodily
symptoms”.

44

various psychosocial outcomes (e.g., anxiety, depression, drug use, etc.; Olson et al.,
2004).
Procedure
Hypothesis 1a. Hypothesis 1a predicted that use of Rationalization as a defense
mechanism would be significantly positively related to overall scale scores on the CRTA. This hypothesis was tested with two different strategies. First, the average Defense-Q
ranking for Rationalization was dichotomized such that: (a) Values greater than 4 (i.e.,
indicating that the defense was previously classified as either somewhat characteristic,
quite characteristic, or most characteristic) were set equal to 1, indicating the presence of
Rationalization in an individual’s typical repertoire of defense mechanisms; and (b)
values less than 4 were set equal to 0 (i.e., indicating that the defense was previously
classified as either most uncharacteristic, quite uncharacteristic, somewhat
uncharacteristic, or neither characteristic nor uncharacteristic), indicating that
Rationalization was not present in an individual’s typical defensive repertoire. With
groups thus established based on the presence or absence of Rationalization in the
Defense-Q profile, an ANOVA was performed to test for significant between-group
differences in overall CRT-A scores. Next, in a second test of Hypothesis 1a, data from
the MacORDS were used to assess the degree to which use of Rationalization would
predict overall CRT-A scores. Specifically, the average MacORDS score for
Rationalization was used as the independent variable in a linear regression analysis,
where total CRT-A score was the dependent variable.
Hypothesis 1b. Hypothesis 1b predicted that use of Rationalization as a defense
mechanism would be significantly and positively related to scores on each keyed CRT-A
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item. This hypothesis was also tested with two different strategies. First, the average
Defense-Q ranking for Rationalization was dichotomized as described above to create
groups based on the presence or absence of Rationalization in the Defense-Q profile.
With groups thus established, a MANOVA was performed to test for significant betweengroup differences in item-level means for the 22 keyed CRT-A items. Second, the
average MacORDS score for Rationalization was used in a standard correlation analysis
to assess the strength and direction of its relationship with each keyed item on the CRTA.
Hypothesis 2a. Hypothesis 2a predicted that use of each of the following defense
mechanisms would be significantly positively related to overall scale scores on the CRTA: Projection, Grandiosity, Turning Against Others, Identification with the Aggressor,
Devaluation, and Neurotic Denial. This hypothesis was tested with two different
strategies. First, the average Defense-Q ranking for each defense mechanism under
investigation was dichotomized just as Rationalization was dichotomized in tests of
Hypotheses 1a and 1b. With groups thus established based on the presence or absence of
each particular defense mechanism in the Defense-Q profile, a series of ANOVAs was
performed to test for significant between-group differences in overall CRT-A scores for
each specific defense mechanism. Next, in a second test of Hypothesis 2a, data from the
MacORDS were used to assess the degree to which use of each of those defense
mechanisms would predict overall CRT-A scores. Specifically, the average MacORDS
scores for Projection, Grandiosity, Turning Against Others, Identification with the
Aggressor, Devaluation, and Neurotic Denial, were each used in turn as the independent
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variable in a series of linear regression analyses, where total CRT-A scores were the
dependent variables.
Hypothesis 2b. Hypothesis 2b predicted that use of each of the following defense
mechanisms would be significantly related to scores on the CRT-A items that tap the
corresponding JM for aggression: Projection (for the hostile attribution bias),
Grandiosity (for the potency bias), Turning Against Others (for the retribution bias),
Identification with the Aggressor (for the victimization by powerful others bias), and
Neurotic Denial (for the social discounting bias). This hypothesis was also tested with
two different strategies. First, the average Defense-Q ranking for each defense
mechanism in question was dichotomized as described above to create groups based on
its presence or absence in the Defense-Q profile. With groups thus established for each
defense mechanism, a series of MANOVAs was performed to test for significant
between-group differences in item-level means for the CRT-A items that have been
shown to load on the corresponding JM-based factors (see Figure 3 for the pattern of item
loadings on each JM-based factor). Second, the average MacORDS score for each of
those defense mechanisms was used in a standard correlation analysis to assess the
strength and direction of the relationship between use of each defense and the CRT-A
items that load on the corresponding JM-based factor (see Figure 3).
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CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

Of the 285 participants who completed the CRT-A, 15 individuals (5.26%)
endorsed five or more of the illogical response options and were thus excluded from all
analyses. The overall mean score on the CRT-A was 3.789 (sd = 2.010). Although the
mean score for males (mean = 4.088, sd = 2.086) was slightly higher than the mean score
for females (mean = 3.688, sd = 1.979), this difference was not statistically significant (F
[1, 268] = 2.023, p = .156).
Of the 270 participants with valid CRT-A data, 189 had their defense mechanism
use rated with the Defense-Q, and 187 had their defense mechanism use rated with the
MacORDS. For both the Defense-Q and the MacORDS, Cronbach’s alpha was
calculated, treating coders as items, to estimate the reliability with which each defense
mechanism was assessed. The following reliabilities were observed for the seven defense
mechanisms under investigation, as assessed with the Defense-Q: Rationalization (.78),
Projection (.44), Grandiosity (.82), Turning Against Others (.68), Identification with the
Aggressor (.80), Devaluation (.83), and Neurotic Denial (.72). For the MacORDS, the
following reliabilities were observed: Rationalization (.54), Projection (.35), Grandiosity
(.74), Turning Against Others (.48), Identification with the Aggressor (.68), Devaluation
(.67), and Neurotic Denial (.54). See Table 1 for intercorrelations among defense
mechanisms assessed with both the Defense-Q and the MacORDS.
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Table 1. Intercorrelations Among Defense Mechanisms Assessed with the Defense-Q and the MacORDS.

Rationalization

Rationalization

Projection

Grandiosity

Turning
Against
Others

Identification
with the
Aggressor

Devaluation

Neurotic Denial

.700***

-.080

.019

.082

-.061

.027

-.222**

-.080

.443***

.069

.224**

-.103

.065

-.144*

.150*

.163*

.800***

.233**

.041

.278**

-.116

.004

.104

.241**

.638***

-.083

.419**

-.201**

.015

-.014

.070

.118

.523***

-.081

.003

.146*

.120

.416**

.473**

.103

.740***

-.053

-.112

-.137

.080

.055

.003

-.095

.721***

Projection
Grandiosity
Turning Against
Others
Identification
with the
Aggressor
Devaluation

Neurotic Denial

Notes: (1) * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01; *** indicates p < .001. (2) Correlations for the Defense-Q are located above the
diagonal and are calculated with Spearman’s rho for rank-order data. (3) Correlations for the MacORDS are located below the
diagonal and are calculated with Pearson’s r. (4) Correlations between Defense-Q and MacORDS data are located on the diagonal, are
italicized for greater emphasis, and are calculated with Spearman’s rho.
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Hypothesis 1a
Hypothesis 1a, which indicated that use of Rationalization as a defense
mechanism would be significantly positively related to overall scale scores on the CRTA, was not supported. In a first test of Hypothesis 1a, an ANOVA using dichotomized
Defense-Q data for Rationalization as the independent variable and total CRT-A scores as
the dependent variable was performed. This analysis yielded non-significant results (F [1,
187] = .668, p > .10, η2 = .004), indicating that when participants were grouped based on
the presence or absence of Rationalization in their typical defense repertoire, there was no
statistically or practically significant between-group difference in CRT-A scores. Due to
vastly unequal group sizes in this analysis, Welch’s approximation of F was also
examined, but the results remained non-significant (F [1, 75.258] = .659, p > .10).
Furthermore, although a slight mean difference was observed in mean CRT-A scores
between groups, it was in the direction opposite of what was expected, such that those
individuals who did not have Rationalization in their Defense-Q profiles showed slightly
higher mean scores on the CRT-A (see Table 2 for summary of descriptive and inferential
statistics).
In a second test of Hypothesis 1a, a linear regression analysis was performed,
using Rationalization scores from the MacORDS as the independent variable and overall
CRT-A scores as the dependent variable. This analysis also failed to show support for
Hypothesis 1a, as the standardized regression weight for Rationalization was nonsignificant (β = -0.015, p > .10) and accounted for essentially none of the observed
variance in CRT-A scores (R2 = .00; see Table 3 for summary of all regression analyses).
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Table 2. Summary of Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA Results for Defense-Q Data Analyzed for Hypotheses 1a and 2a.
Defense Mechanism

CRT-A
Mean (sd)

n

Test of Mean Difference

Effect Size
η2

Observed Power
(α = .05)

Rationalization
Present
Absent

143
46

3.706 (1.957)
3.978 (1.983)

F [1, 187] = .668, p = .415
Welch’s F [1, 75.258] = .659, p = .420

.004

.129

Present
Absent

49
140

3.918 (2.405)
3.721 (1.788)

F [1, 187] = .365, p = .547
Welch’s F [1, 67.482] = .275, p = .602

.002

.092

Present
Absent
Turning Against
Others
Present
Absent
Identification with the
Aggressor
Present
Absent

81
108

4.086 (2.026)
3.537 (1.887)

F [1, 187] = 3.683, p = .056
Welch’s F [1, 165.541] = 3.609, p = .059

.019

.480

60
129

3.867 (2.303)
3.729 (1.789)

F [1, 187] = .202, p = .654
Welch’s F [1, 93.362] = .168, p = .683

.001

.073

50
139

4.320 (1.867)
3.576 (1.963)

F [1, 187] = 5.422, p = .021
Welch’s F [1, 90.625] = 5.686, p = .019

.028

.639

Present
Absent

98
91

4.031 (2.132)
3.495 (1.728)

F [1, 187] = 3.574, p = .060
Welch’s F [1, 183.702] = 3.629, p = .058

.019

.468

Neurotic Denial
Present
Absent

134
55

3.873 (1.901)
3.527 (2.098)

F [1, 187] = 1.214, p = .272
Welch’s F [1, 92.285] = 1.118, p = .293

.006

.195

Projection
Grandiosity

Devaluation
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Table 3. Summary of Regression Analysis Results for MacORDS Data Analyzed for
Hypotheses 1a and 2a.
N

β

p

R2

Rationalization

187

-.015

.836

.000

Projection

187

.019

.794

.000

Grandiosity

187

.182

.013

.033

Turning Against Others

187

.108

.142

.012

Identification with the
Aggressor

187

.125

.087

.016

Devaluation

187

.072

.329

.005

Neurotic Denial

187

-.020

.789

.000

Defense Mechanism
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Hypothesis 1b
Hypothesis 1b, which indicated that use of Rationalization as a defense
mechanism would be significantly and positively related to scores on each keyed CRT-A
item, was not supported. In a first test of Hypothesis 1b, a MANOVA was performed
using dichotomized Defense-Q data for Rationalization as the independent variable and
scores on the 22 keyed CRT-A items as the dependent variables. Results of this
multivariate test were not statistically significant (F [22, 164] = 1.061, p > .10; η2 = .125).
Univariate tests for each item were also examined, revealing only two items with
between-group means that were significantly different at the .05 level (i.e., items 4 and
16); however, these between-group differences in item-level means were in the direction
opposite of that hypothesized, such that individuals without Rationalization in their
Defense-Q profiles showed significantly higher means on those items (see Table 4 for
item descriptives and univariate tests).
In a second test of Hypothesis 1b, MacORDS scores for Rationalization were
correlated with scores from the 22 individual keyed CRT-A items. This analysis also
failed to show support for Hypothesis 1b. Of the 22 correlations examined, only two were
at or near significance at the α = .05 level (i.e., items 3 and 13); however, one of those
significant correlations was in the direction opposite of what was expected (i.e., item 13
was significantly negatively correlated with use of Rationalization; see Table 5 for
summary of relevant correlations).
Hypothesis 2a
Hypothesis 2a, which predicted that use of each defense under investigation (i.e.,
Projection, Grandiosity, Turning Against Others, Identification with the Aggressor,
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Table 4. Summary of MANOVA results for Defense-Q Data Analyzed for Hypotheses 1b and 2b.
Defense
Mechanism
Rationalization

Item
3
4
5
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

CRT-A
Item Mean (sd)
Defense Present
n = 142
.465 (.501)
.162 (.370)
.049 (.217)
.028 (.166)
.063 (.245)
.324 (.470)
.106 (.308)
.247 (.432)
.451 (.499)
.190 (.394)
.296 (.458)
.092 (.289)
.063 (.245)
.162 (.370)
.042 (.202)
.239 (.428)
.190 (.394)
.007 (.084)
.014 (.118)
.331 (.472)
.127 (.334)
.070 (.257)

CRT-A
Item Mean (sd)
Defense Absent
n = 45
.356 (.484)
.333 (.477)
.111 (.318)
.044 (.208)
.022 (.149)
.356 (.484)
.067 (.252)
.244 (.435)
.422 (.499)
.156 (.367)
.267 (.447)
.133 (.344)
.178 (.387)
.133 (.344)
.022 (.149)
.244 (.435)
.244 (.435)
.000 (.000)
.022 (.149)
.378 (.490)
.200 (.405)
.067 (.252)

Mean Difference Test

Effect
Size
η2

Observed
Power
(α = .05)

F [1, 185] = 1.653, p = .200
F [1, 185] = 6.341, p = .013
F [1, 185] = 2.176, p = .142
F [1, 185] = .289, p = .592
F [1, 185] = 1.138, p = .287
F [1, 185] = .153, p = .697
F [1, 185] = .592, p = .443
F [1, 185] = .001, p = .978
F [1, 185] = .111, p = .739
F [1, 185] = .272, p = .602
F [1, 185] = .140, p = .709
F [1, 185] = .649, p = .422
F [1, 185] = 5.513, p = .020
F [1, 185] = .212, p = .646
F [1, 185] = .377, p = .540
F [1, 185] = .005, p = .946
F [1, 185] = .618, p = .433
F [1, 185] = .316, p = .575
F [1, 185] = .142, p = .707
F [1, 185] = .329, p = .567
F [1, 185] = 1.480, p = .225
F [1, 185] = .007, p = .932

.009
.033
.012
.002
.006
.001
.003
.000
.001
.001
.001
.003
.029
.001
.002
.000
.003
.002
.001
.002
.008
.000

.249
.707
.312
.083
.186
.067
.119
.050
.063
.081
.066
.126
.646
.074
.094
.051
.122
.086
.066
.088
.227
.051

Multivariate F [22, 164] = 1.061, p = .395
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.125

.785

Defense
Mechanism
Projection

Item
3
13
16
17
19

Grandiosity
8
11
21

Turning
Against Others
4
5
7
13
17
24

CRT-A
Item Mean (sd)
Defense Present
n = 49
.429 (.500)
.184 (.391)
.061 (.242)
.184 (.391)
.286 (.456)

n = 81
.074 (.264)
.296 (.459)
.000 (.000)

n = 60
.150 (.360)
.100 (.303)
.050 (.220)
.117 (.324)
.167 (.376)
.150 (.360)

Table 4. Continued.
CRT-A
Mean Difference Test
Item Mean (sd)
Defense Absent
n = 139
.439 (.498)
F [1, 186] = .015, p = .901
.180 (.385)
F [1, 186] = .004, p = .953
.101 (.302)
F [1, 186] = .682, p = .410
.144 (.352)
F [1, 186] = .436, p = .510
.230 (.422)
F [1, 186] = .599, p = .440

n = 108
.046 (.211)
.204 (.405)
.009 (.096)

n = 129
.225 (.419)
.047 (.211)
.023 (.151)
.209 (.408)
.155 (.363)
.147 (.356)

Effect
Size
η2

Observed
Power
(α = .05)

.000
.000
.004
.002
.003

.052
.050
.130
.101
.120

Multivariate F [5, 182] = .301, p = .912

.008

.124

F [1, 187] = .647, p = .422
F [1, 187] = 2.157, p = .144
F [1, 187] = .749, p = .388

.003
.011
.004

.126
.309
.138

Multivariate F [3, 185] = 1.093, p = .354

.017

.292

F [1, 187] = 1.422, p = .235
F [1, 187] = 1.970, p = .162
F [1, 187] = .948, p = .332
F [1, 187] = 2.387, p = .124
F [1, 187] = .041, p = .840
F [1, 187] = .002, p = .961

.008
.010
.005
.013
.000
.000

.220
.287
.162
.336
.055
.050

Multivariate F [6, 182] = 1.117, p = .354
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.036

.434

Defense
Mechanism
Identification
with the
Aggressor

Item

7
8
15
16
22
23
24
25

Neurotic
Denial
3
9
10
11
12
14
18
20

CRT-A
Item Mean (sd)
Defense Present

Table 4. Continued.
CRT-A
Mean Difference Test
Item Mean (sd)
Defense Absent

n = 50

n = 139

.020 (.141)
.080 (.274)
.100 (.303)
.080 (.274)
.000 (.000)
.380 (.490)
.180 (.388)
.060 (.240)

.036 (.187)
.050 (.219)
.101 (.302)
.094 (.292)
.022 (.146)
.324 (.470)
.137 (.345)
.072 (.259)

n = 132
.417 (.495)
.303 (.461)
.106 (.309)
.227 (.421)
.462 (.500)
.288 (.455)
.038 (.192)
.227 (.421)

Effect
Size
η2

Observed
Power
(α = .05)

F [1, 187] = .302, p = .583
F [1, 187] = .585, p = .445
F [1, 187] = .000, p = .989
F [1, 187] = .081, p = .776
F [1, 187] = 1.091, p = .298
F [1, 187] = .516, p = .474
F [1, 187] = .542, p = .462
F [1, 187] = .081, p = .776

.002
.003
.000
.000
.006
.003
.003
.000

.085
.119
.050
.059
.180
.110
.113
.059

Multivariate F [8, 180] = .450, p = .889

.020

.207

F [1, 185] = .864, p = .354
F [1, 185] = 1.644, p = .201
F [1, 185] = .492, p = .484
F [1, 185] = .842, p = .360
F [1, 185] = .602, p = .439
F [1, 185] = .002, p = .967
F [1, 185] = .002, p = .961
F [1, 185] = 1.602, p = .207

.005
.009
.003
.005
.003
.000
.000
.009

.152
.247
.107
.150
.121
.050
.050
.242

n = 55
.491 (.505)
.400 (.494)
.073 (.262)
.291 (.458)
.400 (.494)
.291 (.458)
.036 (.189)
.146 (.356)
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Defense
Mechanism
Neurotic
Denial,
continued

Item

24
25

CRT-A
Item Mean (sd)
Defense Present

.152 (.360)
.068 (.253)

Table 4. Continued.
CRT-A
Mean Difference Test
Item Mean (sd)
Defense Absent

Effect
Size
η2

Observed
Power
(α = .05)

F [1, 185] = .183, p = .669
F [1, 185] = .012, p = .912

.001
.000

.071
.051

Multivariate F [10, 176] = .615, p = .800

.034

.314

.127 (.336)
.073 (.262)
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Table 5. Summary of Correlation Results for MacORDS Data Analyzed for
Hypotheses 1b and 2b.
Defense Mechanism
Rationalization

Projection

Grandiosity

r (p)

r (p)

r (p)

3

.138 (.061)

.120 (.103)

4

-.069 (.350)

.048 (.510)

5

-.084 (.253)

.114 (.120)

7

-.040 (.585)

.079 (.281)

8

.038 (.606)

9

.106 (.149)

-.077 (.297)

10

-.037 (.615)

-.081 (.268)

11

.012 (.872)

12

.007 (.922)

13

-.168 (.021)

14

-.008 (.908)

15

-.007 (.925)

16

-.052 (.477)

-.011 (.878)

17

.044 (.551)

-.080 (.274)

18

-.040 (.585)

19

-.017 (.813)

20

-.073 (.319)

21

.057 (.439)

22

.099 (.177)

-.089 (.225)

23

-.087 (.236)

.083 (.261)

24

.022 (.762)

25

.112 (.128)

CRT-A
Item

Turning
Against
Others
r (p)

Identification
with the
Aggressor
r (p)

Neurotic
Denial
r (p)
.023 (.755)

.073 (.322)

-.027 (.717)
-.059 (.423)

.083 (.258)

-.014 (.845)
.061 (.406)

-.082 (.262)

-.112 (.127)
.023 (.754)
.004 (.960)
.040 (.590)
-.014 (.848)
-.070 (.338)

-.015 (.833)
-.023 (.760)
-.134 (.067)

.040 (.586)
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-.017 (.813)

-.027 (.712)

.137 (.061)

-.090 (.220)

Devaluation, and Neurotic Denial) would be significantly positively related to CRT-A
scale scores, was only partially supported. In a first test of Hypothesis 2a, a series of six
ANOVAs was performed, with dichotomized Defense-Q data for each defense
mechanism used as the independent variable (i.e., forming groups based on presence or
absence of the defense in an individual’s Defense-Q profile) and overall CRT-A scores
used as the dependent variable. For all six defense mechanisms under examination, there
were slight between-group differences in mean CRT-A scores in the expected direction
(see Table 2 for summary of descriptive and inferential statistics). However, only three of
those six defenses showed between-group differences that approached or attained
statistical significance, and even those accounted for only a miniscule portion of the
variance in CRT-A scores: Grandiosity (F [1, 187] = 3.683, p = .056, η2 = .019);
Devaluation (F [1, 187] = 3.574, p = .06, η2 = .019); Identification with the Aggressor (F
[1, 187] = 5.422, p < .05, η2 = .028). Between-group differences in CRT-A scores for the
remaining three defense mechanisms did not approach statistical or practical significance:
Projection (F [1, 187] = .365, p > .10, η2 = .002); Turning Against Others (F [1, 187], =
.202, p > .10, η2 = .001); Neurotic Denial (F [1, 187] = 1.214, p > .10, η2 = .006).
In a second test of Hypothesis 2a, a series of linear regression analyses was
performed, using MacORDS scores for each relevant defense mechanism as the
independent variable and overall CRT-A scores as the dependent variable. This set of
analyses also yielded only partial support of Hypothesis 2a, as only one of the six defense
mechanisms under examination – Grandiosity – showed a significant standardized
regression weight (β = 0.182, p = .01, R2 = .033). Results were non-significant for each of
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the other five defense mechanisms: Projection (β = 0.019, p > .10, R2 = .000); Turning
Against Others (β = 0.108, p > .10, R2 = .012); Identification with the Aggressor (β =
0.125, p > .05, R2 = .016); Devaluation (β = 0.072, p > .10, R2 = .005); Neurotic Denial
(β = -0.020, p > .10, R2 = .000; see Table 3 for summary of all regression analyses).
Hypothesis 2b
Hypothesis 2b, which indicated that use of each defense mechanism in question
(i.e., Projection, Grandiosity, Turning Against Others, Identification with the Aggressor,
and Neurotic Denial) would be significantly and positively related to scores on CRT-A
items that tapped the corresponding JMs for aggression, was not supported. In a first test
of Hypothesis 1b, a series of MANOVAs was performed, using dichotomized Defense-Q
data for each defense mechanism as the independent variable and scores on the relevant
CRT-A items as the dependent variables (see Figure 3 for factor loading pattern from
James et al., 2005, factor analysis). None of the results were statistically significant,
either at the multivariate level or the univariate level (see Table 4): Projection (for items
3, 13, 16, 17, and 19; F [5, 182] = .301, p > .10, η2 = .008); Grandiosity (for items 8, 11,
and 21; F [3, 185] = 1.093, p > .10, η2 = .017); Turning Against Others (for items 4, 5, 7,
13, 17, and 24; F [6, 182] = 1.117, p > .10, η2 = .036); Identification with the Aggressor
(for items 7, 8, 15, 16, 22, 23, 24, and 25; F [8, 180] = .450, p > .10, η2 = .020); and
Neurotic Denial (for items 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18, 20, 24, and 25; F [10, 176] = .615, p >
.10, η2 = .034).
In a second test of Hypothesis 2b, MacORDS scores for Projection, Grandiosity,
Turning Against Others, Identification with the Aggressor, and Neurotic Denial, were
correlated with scores on the CRT-A items that have been shown to tap each
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corresponding JM-based factor. Of the thirty-two correlation coefficients examined, none
were significant at the .05 level. Thus, Hypothesis 2b also received no support from this
second series of analyses (see Table 5 for summary of relevant correlations).
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CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION

Overall, results of this study were not largely supportive of the hypotheses that
were presented. Although the CRT-A was shown to align neatly with the theory behind
defense mechanisms, the data presented in this paper do not provide a great deal of
support for the specific relationships between defense mechanisms and JMs for
aggression that have been posited by James and colleagues (James et al., 2005) and by
the current author. In particular, the defense mechanism known as Rationalization was
not shown to relate meaningfully to scale scores on the CRT-A, or to individual items on
the CRT-A. Furthermore, of the remaining six defense mechanisms that were examined,
only three (i.e., Grandiosity, Identification with the Aggressor, and Devaluation showed
any hint of a relation to CRT-A scale scores, and none of them related meaningfully to
theoretically relevant CRT-A items.
Reconsidering the Role of Defense Mechanisms in the CRT-A
Rationalization
James and colleagues (James et al., 2005) have indicated that the defense
mechanism known as Rationalization is influential in the use of JMs for aggression.
Additionally, the current author attempted to clarify the nature of this influence through a
careful comparison of the defining characteristics of each concept. The presumed
relationship between Rationalization and the JMs for aggression is well grounded in

62

theory – a fact that makes the lack of empirical support from this study all the more
surprising.
The hypothesized Rationalization–JM link was examined with two different kinds
of data and two different analytical strategies (i.e., scale-level and item-level). First, data
from the Defense-Q were used to group individuals based on the presence or absence of
Rationalization in their typical defensive repertoire. Mean CRT-A scores for each group
were then compared, with the expectation that individuals who tended to use defensive
Rationalization would also show a greater tendency to use the JMs for aggression, and
therefore have higher overall scores on the CRT-A. A one-way ANOVA showed no
significant between-group differences. Due to the severely unequal group sizes (i.e., 143
individuals had Rationalization present in their Defense-Q profile, whereas only 46 were
in the Rationalization-absent group), Welch’s approximation of F was also examined;
however, the results still indicated an inability to reject the null hypothesis of no
between-group differences in CRT-A mean scores. Moreover, the slight mean difference
that was observed was in the direction opposite of that which was hypothesized, with
Rationalizers averaging slightly lower on the CRT-A (mean = 3.706, sd = 1.957) than
non-Rationalizers (mean = 3.978, sd = 1.983).
Following this scale-level analysis of CRT-A scores, data from the Defense-Q
were also used to determine whether individuals who show characteristic use of defensive
Rationalization would show higher CRT-A item-level means as compared to their nonRationalizing counterparts. Once again, results indicated that the null hypothesis could
not be rejected. That is, there were no statistically significant between-group differences
in item-level means on the set of CRT-A items as a whole, or on any of the individual
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items. Furthermore, although the power to detect a significant mean difference was
somewhat low in the first of the aforementioned analyses (i.e., power at the α = .05 level
was only .129), it was reasonably strong in the multivariate portion of the second analysis
(.785).
The second round of tests for the hypothesized Rationalization—JM relationship
utilized data from the MacORDS, a normative instrument used to rate the extent to which
individuals tend to employ each of several defense mechanisms. To test the scale-level
hypothesis that users of defensive Rationalization would show higher mean scores on the
CRT-A, overall CRT-A scores were regressed onto MacORDS ratings for
Rationalization. Results of this analysis were non-significant (β = -.015, p = .836), and
indicated that use of Rationalization as rated with the MacORDS accounted for virtually
none of the observed variance in overall CRT-A scores (R2 = .00).
Following this second scale-level analysis of CRT-A scores, data from the
MacORDS were used to assess whether individuals who use Rationalization to a greater
extent also showed higher CRT-A item-level means. MacORDS scores for
Rationalization were correlated with scores on each of the 22 keyed CRT-A items. It was
expected that all 22 correlation coefficients would be significant and positive. However,
only two of the correlations approached or attained significance at the α = .05 level, and
of those, one was in the direction opposite of that hypothesized (i.e., item 13 showed a
significant negative correlation, indicating that use of Rationalization was inversely
related to choice of the JM-laden response option for that item). Furthermore, only 12 of
the 22 correlations were in the expected positive direction. Thus, for the fourth time, the
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general hypothesis that Rationalization would relate significantly and positively to use of
the JMs for aggression was not supported.
In summary, analyses based on data from both the Defense-Q and the MacORDS
indicated that use of the defense mechanism known as Rationalization was not related to
use of the JMs for aggression as assessed with the CRT-A – either at the overall scale
level or at the item level. These null results are surprising given that the JMs for
aggression are, by definition, strategies aimed at enhancing the logical or rational appeal
of engaging in aggressive behavior. One possible explanation for this lack of significant
results is that as a group, the individuals in this sample did not possess a strong motive to
aggress. Although James and McIntyre (2000) note that about 12% of the general
population seem to possess at least a moderately strong motive to aggress, only 7.7% of
the participants in this sample scored in the “aggressive” range on the CRT-A (i.e., 21 out
of 270 people selected 7 or more of the JM-laden responses). As noted in an earlier
section of this paper, Rationalization may be one of several factors that influence the use
of JMs for aggression. An additional factor, and one of perhaps greater importance, is the
presence of a strong implicit motive to aggress. Recall that Rationalization, like any other
defense mechanism, can operate to help an individual adapt to any anxiety-provoking
motive or impulse; thus, the use of defensive Rationalization does not in any way imply
that an individual is possessed of a strong motive to aggress. Indeed, in the absence of
such a motive, one would have no reason to expect that Rationalization would relate
empirically to CRT-A scores or individual items.
A second possible explanation for this seemingly antithetical outcome, however,
is that JMs may not be influenced by truly defensive Rationalization. Although JMs for
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aggression clearly involve the creation of excuses to justify engaging in aggressive
behavior, these rationalizations may not be as implicit or unconscious as once believed.
That is, JMs for aggression may be more closely akin to coping strategies than to defense
mechanisms.
Defense mechanisms versus coping strategies. Researchers and scholars in the
area of defense mechanisms have tended, at times, to blur the lines between defense
mechanisms and coping strategies. This problem is somewhat understandable given that
both defense mechanisms and coping strategies are adaptational processes that share a
similar goal: “…to relieve stress and perceived adversity” (Cramer, 1998a, p. 919-920).
Nevertheless, several characteristics have been proposed to help distinguish between the
two concepts, including: 1) Conscious versus unconscious; 2) intentional versus
nonintentional; 3) situational versus dispositional; 4) nonhierarchical versus hierarchical;
and 5) normal versus pathological. However, Cramer (1998a; 2000) notes that it is only
the first two of these features that are critical for making the distinction between defense
and coping. In particular, she makes the following defining observations based on those
two criteria:
“Coping mechanisms involve a conscious, purposeful effort, while defense
mechanisms are processes that occur without conscious effort and without
conscious awareness (i.e., they are unconscious). Also, coping strategies are
carried out with the intent of managing or solving a problem situation, while
defense mechanisms occur without conscious intentionality; the latter function to
change an internal psychological state but may have no effect on external
reality…” (Cramer, 1998a, p. 921).
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To summarize, then, coping strategies may occur when some stressor is recognized (e.g.,
some conflict, anxiety, or psychological disequilibrium) and a choice is made to change
something in the external environment (i.e., outside of the mind) in order to alleviate that
stress. Defense mechanisms, on the other hand, occur when the ego acts automatically
and unconsciously to alleviate an unrecognized conflict by changing something in the
internal environment (i.e., inside the mind).
The finding that defensive Rationalization did not relate empirically to use of JMs
for aggression raises the possibility that JMs may not be completely unconscious or
implicit, as has been assumed. Rather, JMs for aggression may be conscious means of
rationalizing, or making excuses for, aggressive behavior. That is, JMs for aggression
may be coping strategies for approaching recognized anxiety or conflict situations (e.g.,
being insulted by others), as opposed to implicit cognitive strategies for dealing with an
unrecognized internal conflict between competing motives (i.e., the motive to aggress
versus the motive to see the self and be seen by others as a good and worthy individual).
Examining Additional Defense Mechanism—JM Links
Rationalization was the only specific defense mechanism that James and
colleagues (James et al., 2005) mentioned as influential in the general use of JMs for
aggression. However, the current author identified several additional defenses that
appeared similar in definition and function to the specific JMs for aggression. In
particular, one type of ego defense was shown to have parallels with each distinct JM,
resulting in the following defense mechanism—JM pairs: Projection—hostile attribution
bias; Grandiosity—potency bias; Turning Against Others—retribution bias; Identification
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with the Aggressor—victimization by powerful others bias; Devaluation—derogation of
target bias; and Neurotic Denial—social discounting bias.
These additional hypothesized relationships were examined with the same pattern
of analyses that was used for Rationalization, as discussed above. That is, hypotheses
about each defense mechanism—JM pair were tested with two different kinds of data and
two different analytical strategies (i.e., scale-level and item-level). However, whereas the
scale-level analyses were straightforward, as they simply employed overall CRT-A scale
scores as dependent variables, the item-level analyses were somewhat equivocal for two
reasons. First, the “aggressive” response options for CRT-A items are not necessarily
unidimensional, so any one of those keyed item responses may be based on multiple JMs
for aggression. As a result, clean JM-based CRT-A subscales do not exist, and ideal tests
of these item-level hypotheses were not possible. Nevertheless, James et al.’s (2005)
factor analysis of the CRT-A was used as a proxy guide for examining item-level
relationships. Second, the aforementioned factor analysis identified only five latent
factors to account for the CRT-A’s data structure, whereas there are six JMs for
aggression. Specifically, a factor was identified for each of the six JMs except for the
derogation of target bias. As a result, item-level hypotheses were not examined for
Devaluation, the defense mechanism that was shown to be similar to the derogation of
target bias. In short, the item-level analyses examined in this study were a bit of a long
shot to begin with; however, given the preliminary and exploratory nature of this study, it
seemed appropriate to examine the data from this perspective, regardless of the less-thanoptimal analytic situation.
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As mentioned above, the six defense mechanism—JM pairs were examined in a
manner identical to the analyses used for Rationalization. That is, Defense-Q data were
used to dichotomize individuals based on the presence or absence of each defense
mechanism in their typical defensive repertoire, and analyses were conducted to test for
mean differences between groups at both the overall scale level and at the item level.
Additionally, for the second set of scale-level analyses, CRT-A scores were regressed
onto MacORDS scores for each defense mechanism, and for the second set of item-level
analyses, correlations were computed between each defense mechanism and the relevant
items from the CRT-A, as indicated by the James et al. (2005) factor analytic results.
No significant results were observed for the defense mechanisms known as
Projection, Turning Against Others, and Neurotic Denial. ANOVAs with groups based on
Defense-Q data indicated that there were no mean differences in CRT-A scores between
users and non-users of each of these defenses. Additionally, because there were sizeable
differences in cell sizes for those groups, Welch’s mean difference test was examined for
each analysis; however, none of these tests showed results that differed from the standard
F-statistic, and all mean differences – although in the expected direction – were deemed
statistically insignificant. Similarly, MANOVAs with groups based on Defense-Q data
indicated that there were no significant mean differences at the item level, from the
omnibus multivariate perspective or from the individual item perspective. It is
noteworthy to add, however, that statistical power was quite low for all of these mean
difference tests (power at the α = .05 level for detecting a mean difference in overall
CRT-A scores was .092 for Projection, .073 for Turning Against Others, and .195 for
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Neurotic Denial; for the multivariate tests of item-level means, power was .124 for
Projection, .434 for Turning Against Others, and .314 for Neurotic Denial).
Hypothesis tests for Projection, Turning Against Others, and Neurotic Denial also
yielded null results when data from the MacORDS were analyzed. Specifically, when
CRT-A scale scores were regressed onto MacORDS scores, standardized regression
weights were statistically insignificant for all three defense mechanisms. Additionally, in
all three cases, the defense mechanism accounted for almost none of the variance in
overall CRT-A scores (Projection, R2 = .000; Turning Against Others, R2 = .012;
Neurotic Denial, R2 = .000). Furthermore, correlations between the defense mechanism
scores and the relevant CRT-A items also failed to support the hypotheses. For
Projection, the following pattern of significant item-correlations was expected: Item 3
(negative), item 13 (negative), item 16 (positive), item 17 (positive), and item 19
(positive); however, none of these item-level correlations were statistically significant,
and only one of them was in the expected direction (i.e., item 13 showed a nonsignificant negative correlation with MacORDS scores for Projection, but the other
correlations were in the direction opposite of what was hypothesized). For Turning
Against Others, the following pattern of significant item-level correlations was expected:
Items 4, 5, 7, 13, 17, and 24 (all positive); however, none of these correlations were
statistically significant, and only four of the six were in the hypothesized direction (i.e.,
items 13 and 17 showed non-significant negative correlations with MacORDS scores for
Turning Against Others, but the remaining correlations were in the expected direction).
For Neurotic Denial, the following pattern of significant item-level correlations was
expected: Items 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18, 20, 24, and 25 (all positive); however, none of
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those correlations were statistically significant, and the majority were in the direction
opposite of what was hypothesized (i.e., items 3, 12, and 14 showed non-significant
positive correlations with MacORDS scores for Neurotic Denial, while the remaining
items showed non-significant negative correlations).
For both Identification with the Aggressor and Devaluation, only a hint of support
was attained for the hypothesized relationships. ANOVAs with groups based on DefenseQ data indicated that there was a statistically significant mean difference in CRT-A
scores between users and non-users of Identification with the Aggressor (p = .021 for the
standard F-statistic, and p = .019 for Welch’s approximation of F), and that the mean
difference between users and non-users of Devaluation approached significance (p = .06
for the standard F-statistic, and p = .058 for Welch’s approximation of F); however, the
effect size in both cases was exceptionally small (i.e., η2 = .028 and .019, respectively),
despite a moderate amount of power to detect mean differences at the α = .05 level (i.e.,
estimates of statistical power were .639 and .468, respectively). Nevertheless, a
MANOVA with groups based on Defense-Q data for Identification with the Aggressor 4
indicated that there were no significant mean differences at the item level, from the
omnibus multivariate perspective or from the individual item perspective (power at the α
= .05 level for the multivariate test of item-level means was .207).
Similarly, hypothesis tests for Identification with the Aggressor and Devaluation
yielded null results when data from the MacORDS were analyzed. Specifically, when
CRT-A scale scores were regressed onto MacORDS scores, standardized regression
weights were statistically insignificant for both of these defense mechanisms.
4

Recall that no item-level hypotheses were made concerning Devaluation, as James et al. (2005)
failed to identify a factor in the CRT-A’s data structure that corresponded to the derogation of target bias.
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Additionally, in both cases, the defense mechanism accounted for almost none of the
variance in overall CRT-A scores (Identification with the Aggressor, R2 = .016;
Devaluation, R2 = .005). Furthermore, correlations between the MacORDS scores for
Identification with the Aggressor and the relevant CRT-A items also failed to support the
hypothesized relationship. Specifically, the following pattern of significant itemcorrelations was expected: Item 7 (positive), item 8 (negative), items 15, 16, 22, 23, 24,
and 25 (all positive); however, only one of these item-level correlations even approached
significance (for item 25, r = .137, p = .061), and three of them were in the direction
opposite of what was hypothesized (i.e., items 7, 22, and 24 showed non-significant
negative correlations MacORDS scores for Identification with the Aggressor, but the
other correlations were in the expected directions).
Of all the defense mechanisms under investigation in the current study,
Grandiosity is the only one that showed any kind of consistent support for the
hypothesized relationships; however, even this degree of support was far from strong and
unequivocal. An ANOVA with groups based on Defense-Q data indicated a mean
difference in CRT-A scores between users and non-users of Grandiosity that approached
statistical significance (p = .056 for the standard F-statistic, and p = .059 for Welch’s
approximation of F); however, the effect size was incredibly small (i.e., η2 = .019),
despite a moderate amount of power to detect a mean difference at the α = .05 level (i.e.,
the estimates of statistical power was .480). Similarly, when overall CRT-A scale scores
were regressed onto MacORDS scores for Grandiosity, the standardized regression
weight was small, but statistically significant (β = .182, p = .013); however, the defense
mechanism accounted for very little of the variance in overall CRT-A scores (R2 = .033).
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Despite the slight degree of support from the scale-level analyses with
Grandiosity, item-level analyses again failed to show support for the hypothesized
relationship. A MANOVA with groups based on Defense-Q data indicated that between
users and non-users of Grandiosity, there were no significant mean differences at the item
level, from either the omnibus multivariate perspective or from the individual item
perspective (power at the α = .05 level for the multivariate test of item-level means was
.292). Furthermore, when MacORDS scores for Grandiosity were correlated with
relevant CRT-A items, results did not show the following pattern of expected itemcorrelations: Items 8, 11, and 21 (all positive). Of the three correlations examined, none
was statistically significant, and only two were in the expected direction; additionally, the
one correlation that approached significance was in the direction opposite of what was
hypothesized (item 21, r = -.134, p = .067).
To summarize, analyses of data from both the Defense-Q and the MacORDS
showed little support for the notion that use of certain theoretically relevant defense
mechanisms would be related to use of corresponding JMs for aggression. In particular,
no support was garnered for the item-level hypotheses that use of the defense
mechanisms known as Projection, Grandiosity, Turning Against Others, Identification
with the Aggressor, and Neurotic Denial, would be related to endorsement of the
“aggressive” responses on items from the CRT-A that appear to tap the corresponding
JMs for aggression (i.e., hostile attribution bias, potency bias, retribution bias,
victimization by powerful others bias, and social discounting bias, respectively).
Furthermore, very little support was demonstrated for the hypothesis that use of the
defense mechanisms known as Projection, Grandiosity, Turning Against Others,
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Identification with the Aggressor, Devaluation, or Neurotic Denial, would be related to
total scale scores on the CRT-A (i.e., the total number of JM-laden responses that were
endorsed). Although analysis of Defense-Q data showed a slight indication that users of
three of those specific defense mechanisms (i.e., Identification with the Aggressor,
Devaluation, and Grandiosity) might make more frequent use of the JMs for aggression
overall, analysis of MacORDS data only replicated this result for the defense known as
Grandiosity. These results are preliminary and equivocal, and they should be interpreted
with caution. However, they tentatively point to an alternative explanation of how and
why the CRT-A has done such a good job of predicting aggressive behavior.
The CRT-A and the Theory of Threatened Egotism
It was surprising, yet interesting, that Grandiosity was the only defense
mechanism examined in this study that showed a somewhat consistent relationship with
the CRT-A. Although a traditional and long-held view of aggressive behavior has stated
that aggression stems from low self-esteem, a different point of view has emerged over
the past decade or so. In particular, Baumeister and colleagues (Baumeister, Smart, &
Boden, 1996) provided an exhaustive review of studies on self-esteem and
aggressive/violent behavior, and they concluded that there was very little empirical
evidence to support the view of low self-esteem as a major cause of aggression. Rather,
most evidence seemed to converge on the notion that it is individuals with high levels of
self-esteem who are more likely to engage in aggressive or violent behavior. In their
theory of threatened egotism, however, Baumeister and others (Baumeister et al., 1996;
Bushman & Baumeister, 1998) explicitly note that the link between high self-esteem and
aggression is neither simple nor direct.
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Baumeister et al. (1996) define egotism as “…favorable appraisals of self
and…the motivated preference for such favorable appraisals, regardless of whether they
are valid or inflated,” and they note that, “Any assumption or belief that one is a superior
being, or any broadly favorable assessment of self (especially in comparison with other
people), is relevant” (p. 6). The theory of threatened egotism states that individuals with
an egotistical view of the self which is unstable, inflated, or tenuous/uncertain, are (a)
more likely to encounter, and (b) more likely to be sensitive to, negative evaluations from
others. These negative evaluations can take virtually any form and pertain to anything
that calls into question or undermines the individual’s favorable self-appraisal and/or
sense of superiority, resulting in a discrepancy or conflict between internal-/selfevaluations and external-/other-evaluations. In the presence of such a discrepancy, the
individual is said to experience threatened egotism, and s/he is faced with a choice of
whether to accept the negative evaluation (and be forced to revise and lower the selfappraisal) or to reject the negative evaluation (and therefore maintain the current selfappraisal). In the case of the former, the individual would likely experience negative
emotions toward the self, resulting in withdrawal from the situation. However, in the case
of the latter, the individual would likely experience negative emotions toward the source
of the unfavorable evaluation, resulting in aggression or violence toward that source in an
effort to re-assert (i.e., prove) his/her superiority.
Research with the theory of threatened egotism has, thus far, been supportive of
the theory and has underscored the notion that it is not high self-esteem in general, but
the inflated, unstable high self-esteem characteristic of narcissism that is most strongly
associated with aggression. Baumeister and colleagues (Baumeister, Bushman, &
75

Campbell, 2000) cite the American Psychiatric Association in stating that narcissism is
defined by, “…grandiose views of personal superiority, an inflated sense of entitlement,
low empathy toward others, fantasies of personal greatness, a belief that ordinary people
cannot understand one, and the like…” (p. 27). Thus narcissism, as a more narrowly
defined facet of “favorable self-appraisal,” helps to emphasize the unrealistically inflated
aspect of self-esteem that is believed to be involved in aggression due to threatened
egotism. Indeed, a number of empirical studies now exist that have linked narcissism to
various kinds of aggressive behavior (e.g., Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Penney &
Spector, 2002; Twenge & Campbell, 2003).
The finding from the current study that the defense mechanism known as
Grandiosity showed a significant relationship with the CRT-A is less surprising when
considered through the lens of the theory of threatened egotism. Grandiosity as a defense
mechanism was defined by MacGregor and Davidson (1998) as the transformation of a
threatening or anxiety-providing impulse into a continued sense or assumption of one’s
own specialness and superiority. As noted in the definition of narcissism provided above,
a grandiose self-view is one of the defining characteristics of narcissism, as is a sense of
entitlement and specialness that sets an individual apart from (i.e., above) other people.
From this point of view, the Grandiosity—CRT-A relationship can be seen to fit with the
theory of threatened egotism. Indeed, the theory of threatened egotism may provide a
succinct explanation of how and why the CRT-A works to predict aggressive behavior.
Individuals who tend to use Grandiosity as a defense mechanism appear to have a
favorable view of self that fits Baumeister et al.’s (1996) criteria for proneness to
threatened egotism (i.e., a favorable self-appraisal that is unstable, inflated, and/or
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uncertain). Because their self-appraisals tend to be unrealistically inflated, those
individuals are likely to be highly sensitive to negative appraisals from others, so that
even a slight challenge to their tenuous, yet passionately-held, sense of superiority and
dominance – such as the situations encountered in items on the CRT-A – may result in a
state of threatened egotism. The frequency with which individuals endorse the JM-laden
responses on the CRT-A may be seen as an index of this sensitivity to negative
appraisals, such that individuals whose reasoning is more seriously biased by the JMs for
aggression are more likely to perceive a discrepancy between internal and external
evaluations and thus experience threatened egotism. When faced with threatened egotism,
an individual who engages in defensive Grandiosity would be expected to reject the
negative external evaluation, experience negative emotions toward the source of the
unfavorable evaluation, and engage in aggressive behavior to reaffirm – to the self and to
others – that s/he is, indeed, the superior being.
In summary, the theory of threatened egotism (Baumeister et al., 1996) may be a
useful framework for explaining and understanding the Grandiosity—CRT-A relationship
discovered in the current study, and it may point to an alternative explanation for how
and why the CRT-A predicts aggressive behavior. Under James and colleagues’ (James,
1998; James & Mazerolle, 2002; James et al., 2005) theoretical conceptualization, the
CRT-A predicts aggressive behavior because it indexes the strength of an individual’s
implicit motive to aggress. That is, the frequency with which an individual endorses the
JM-laden responses on the CRT-A is seen as an indicator of how often that individual’s
motive to aggress is activated and comes into conflict with the motive to see the self as a
good and just individual (i.e., how often the individual needs to engage in defensive
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processes similar to Rationalization in order to allow expression of his or her motive to
aggress without experiencing the stress and anxiety that might accompany conscious
knowledge of that motive). However, the lack of a discovered relationship between the
CRT-A and Rationalization, coupled with its reasonably consistent relationship with
Grandiosity, may indicate that a different sort of process is at work and that the JMs for
aggression serve a different purpose. In particular, when considered in terms of the theory
of threatened egotism, it is plausible that the CRT-A predicts aggressive behavior
because it indexes an individual’s sensitivity to discrepancies between self- and otherevaluations. In this conceptualization, endorsement of the JM-laden responses on the
CRT-A may be seen as an indicator of an individual’s vulnerability to threatened
egotism. From this point of view, the role of the JMs for aggression is no longer to
facilitate the psychologically “safe” expression of the implicit motive to aggress. On the
contrary, for the narcissistic or grandiose individual, the motive to aggress is unlikely to
cause a great deal of anxiety, even if it is consciously recognized; instead, it would likely
be viewed as further evidence of one’s strength and superiority. Rather, from this
perspective, the role of the JMs for aggression may be to heighten the grandiose
individual’s sensitivity to negative evaluations by others, alerting them to the presence of
threatened egotism and the need for a definitive – or even proactive – response to prevent
a revision or reduction of the self-appraisal.
General Discussion
The main purposes of this paper were to explain the theoretical overlap between
defense mechanisms and the CRT-A, and to provide empirical tests of the extent to which
the use of various theoretically relevant defense mechanisms is related to use of the JMs
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for aggression. The first aim was achieved by providing an overview of both the theory
behind defense mechanisms and the theory on which the CRT-A was built. Following
this overview, a set of modern definitional criteria for defense mechanisms was used as a
framework for integrating the CRT-A with the theory of defense mechanisms. The
second aim was achieved through several steps. First, James et al.’s (2005) notion about
the impact of defensive Rationalization on the use of JMs for aggression was expanded
and explained. Next, each JM for aggression was shown to align with a specific defense
mechanism, in addition to Rationalization, that has been described in the literature.
Finally, formal hypotheses about these relationships were proposed and tested, allowing
tentative conclusions to be drawn about the relationship between a small set of
theoretically relevant defense mechanisms and the CRT-A.
Strengths and Limitations
A major strength of this study is that it begins to fill a critical gap in conditional
reasoning research by pursuing one of the fundamental goals of scientific psychology:
Theory testing. James and colleagues (James, 1998; James & Mazerolle, 2002; James et
al., 2005) have published several major works about the CRT-A, and they have refined
their theory along the way, making increasingly specific statements about the nature and
function of the JMs for aggression it was designed to assess. In particular, these changes
culminated in the explicit recognition of the CRT-A’s roots in the classical psychological
concept of defense mechanisms (James et al., 2005). However, this study represents the
first attempt to provide empirical tests of these theoretical relationships by examining the
links between defense mechanisms and the JMs for aggression.
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A second strength of this study is that it employed two different types of defense
mechanism measures. Specifically, defense mechanisms were measured from an
idiographic perspective with the Defense-Q, and from a normative or nomothetic
perspective with the MacORDS. As a result, the author was able to test each hypothesis
twice, which amounted to a built-in replication of each analysis. This two-sided attack
essentially allowed a wider empirical net to be cast for the hypothesis tests, which was
particularly beneficial in this study given the complete lack of existing research linking
the CRT-A with defense mechanisms.
A third strength of this study is that both of the defense mechanism measures
employed consisted of observer-reports from multiple trained coders. As discussed in a
previous section of this paper, observer-reports may represent one of the most appropriate
and theoretically sound methods for measuring defense mechanisms. That is, observerreport instruments tend to side-step the problems that arise when participants are asked to
introspect and self-report on mental processes that are believed to be unconscious.
In contrast with the aforementioned strengths, there were also several limitations
associated with this study. First, the study employed data from a Canadian student
sample. To the current author’s knowledge, CRT-A data have never been collected from
an entire sample of Canadian participants. Furthermore, no criterion measure was
available in the current study, so the author was unable to ascertain whether the CRT-A
showed the same degree of predictive validity as is typically seen in U.S. samples (i.e.,
whether a given score “means” the same thing in a different sample). Although Canada
and the U.S. share a border, there are aspects of their respective cultures that differ in
ways that could be relevant to beliefs about, perceptions of, and engagement in
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aggressive behavior (e.g., frequency of firearm ownership, homicide rates, acceptability
of capital punishment – all of which could be seen as outcomes of a society that is more
tolerant of violence/aggression, and all of which are higher in the U.S. than in Canada).
As a result of these and other cultural differences, there is a possibility that U.S. and
Canadian respondents might view items on the CRT-A differently for reasons unrelated
to the level of their respective motives to aggress. Nevertheless, the CRT-A mean and
standard deviation observed in this study (mean = 3.79, sd = 2.01) was similar to that
reported by other researchers reporting data from a comparable sample from the United
States (e.g., mean = 3.62, sd = 2.02; LeBreton et al., 2007).
A second weakness of this study is that most of the between-group analyses were
based on vastly unequal group sizes. When this occurs, ANOVA is less robust to
violations of the assumption of homogeneity of variance. Thus, although there were only
two incidents of serious heteroscedasticity (i.e., Levene’s test was only significant for
Projection and for Turning Against Others), Welch’s mean difference test was always
performed in addition to the standard ANOVA. However, there were no cases in which
Welch’s approximation of F led to a different conclusion than the standard F-statistic.
This seems to indicate that, while the unequal cell sizes were certainly sub-optimal from
an analytic point of view, this issue may not have been the biggest problem with the
dataset used in this study.
A third and much more critical weakness in this study was that both defense
mechanism instruments showed unacceptably low reliabilities for the measurement of
some defenses. As indicated in the Results section, the following reliabilities (calculated
with Cronbach’s alpha, treating coders as items) were observed with the Defense-Q and
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the MacORDS for each defense mechanism included in this study: Rationalization (.78,
.54); Projection (.44, .35); Grandiosity (.82, .74); Turning Against Others (.68, .48);
Identification with the Aggressor (.80, .68); Devaluation (.83, .67); Neurotic Denial (.72,
.54). Perhaps more than anything else, these reliabilities could explain the pattern of
results that was seen in the hypothesis tests. Specifically, of all seven defense
mechanisms examined, only Grandiosity showed acceptably reliable measurement with
both instruments. It cannot be coincidental that Grandiosity was also the only defense for
which relatively consistent results were seen. It is likely that measurement error
contributed to the null results found for all of the other defense mechanisms.
Directions for Future Research
Future research in this area should aim to correct some of the limitations seen in
this study. In particular, it would be useful to utilize measures of defense mechanisms
that were not so contaminated with measurement error. Beyond this basic remedial issue,
one area for future research is the determination of whether JMs for aggression are truly
implicit/unconscious as opposed to conscious and intentional – that is, whether JMs
function in a manner that is more similar to defense mechanisms or to coping strategies.
Another potentially fruitful area for future research would be to test the
propositions put forth in this paper concerning the theory of threatened egotism
(Baumeister et al., 1996). This post-hoc reconceptualization of the CRT-A and the JMs
for aggression marks a significant departure from the original theory put forth by James
and colleagues (James, 1998; James & Mazerolle, 2002; James et al., 2005). However, it
dovetails neatly with recent work in the area of narcissism and aggression (e.g., Bushman
& Baumeister, 1998; Penney & Spector, 2002; Salmivalli, 2001; Twenge & Campbell,
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2003), and it is therefore difficult – and unnecessary – to dismiss the current findings as
pure coincidence, despite the methodological limitations associated with this study.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this study represents the first known attempt to assess the empirical
relationships between the CRT-A and various defense mechanisms that appeared to be
theoretically relevant to the development and/or use of the JMs for aggression. Although
the preliminary nature of this investigation combined with weaknesses in the dataset
prevent strong and unequivocal conclusions from being drawn, two tentative conclusions
did emerge. First and foremost, despite James and colleagues’ (James et al., 2005)
statement that the defense mechanism known as Rationalization is influential in the use
of JMs for aggression, this relation was not borne out empirically. The lack of a
significant discovered relationship between Rationalization and the CRT-A calls into
question the means by which the JMs for aggression actually operate and the requisite
means by which the CRT-A has been able to predict aggressive behavior. That is,
whereas the published theoretical statements about the CRT-A indicate that JMs for
aggression are unconscious rationalizations for engaging in aggressive behavior, the
current set of findings casts an initial shadow of doubt on this conceptualization.
Additionally, the discovery of a relationship between defensive Grandiosity and the CRTA suggests that Baumeister’s theory of threatened egotism (Baumeister et al., 1996) may
be able to fill this explanatory gap.
Although this study did not uphold the theoretical proposition that the JMs for
aggression are unconscious defensive Rationalizations, the results should not be
interpreted as a death knell for the CRT-A. It is important to note that the CRT-A is still a
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useful and valid instrument for identifying and screening out aggression-prone job
applicants. By bearing the concept of defense mechanisms in mind while developing the
CRT-A, James and colleagues were able to create a subtle and innovative indirect
measure that predicts aggressive behavior better than many other measures that are
available today. For the time being, this is the only statement that can be conclusively
made.
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APPENDIX A

Coding Sheet for the Defense-Q
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Defense-Q Coding
Coder ID number and name
Coder sex

____________________________________
____________________________________

Interviewer ID number
Interviewer sex

____________________________________
____________________________________

Participant ID number
Participant sex

____________________________________
____________________________________

Tape number

____________________________________

Instructions
Q-sort the 25 defense mechanisms into seven piles with 1, 2, 5, 9, 5, 2, 1, cards in each
pile. The cards are sorted according to whether they are characteristic of the individual you are
assessing. Once you are finished, record the number of the defense mechanisms in the
appropriate spaces below the category headings.
Uncharacteristic
Most (1), Quite (2)
Somewhat (5)
___

___ ___

___ ___ ___ ___ ___

Neither Characteristic
nor Uncharacteristic
(9)

___ ___ ___ ___ ___
___ ___ ___ ___

Characteristic
Somewhat (5)
Quite (2), Most (1)
___ ___ ___ ___ ___
___ ___

___

Next rate the individual’s overall defensiveness, in terms of : 1) how effective the
defenses are (in quelling anxiety), 2) the individual’s need for defenses (i.e., how much
unresolved anxiety is present), and 3) how active are the individual’s defenses typically (i.e., is
the person generally “defensive” or “non-defensive”).
Low
Medium
High
Typical effectiveness
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Typical need for defenses
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Typical activation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Indicate the degree of confidence you have in the accuracy of the ratings you made of this
individual at this time.
Low
Medium
High
Confidence in rating
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
______________________________________________________________________________
_
Do Not Quote Without Permission of the Authors
Michael Wm. MacGregor, Trevor R. Olson, Michelle D. Presniak, & Karina Davidson
(michael.macgregor@usask.ca)
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APPENDIX B

Coding Sheet for the MacORDS

Reprinted with Permission of the Authors
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MacORDS
(MacGregor Observer Rated Defense Scale)
Coder's ID number and name
Coder's sex

____________________________________
____________________________________

Interviewer's ID number
Interviewer's sex

____________________________________
____________________________________

Participant's ID number
Participant's sex

____________________________________
____________________________________

Study number
Tape number

____________________________________
____________________________________

Normative Ratings
Absent/
Almost Never
Sublimation
Reaction formation
Displacement
Dissociation
Isolation
Splitting
Regression
Devaluation
Humor
Identification with the
Aggressor
Turning against self
Projection
Pseudoaltruism
Acting Out
Rationalization
Intellectualization
Fantasy
Psychotic Denial
Undoing
Passive Aggression
Repression
Neurotic Denial
Grandiosity
Turning against others
Idealization
Somatization

Present/
Almost Always

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
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